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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Political Economy of Neoliberal Market Reforms:  
Examining the implementation of neoliberal reforms in developing countries 
By 
Brian Thomas Wiley 
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology 
University of California, Irvine, 2019 
Professor David A. Smith, Chair 
 
 This dissertation examines the implementation of neoliberal market reforms in 
developing countries in the global periphery from 1980-2005. Using a mixed methods approach 
of OLS and logistic regression, as well as fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) 
this dissertation seeks to answer two main questions: 1) How impactful is conditional lending in 
getting countries to implement neoliberal market reforms? 2) What are the different pathways to 
neoliberal market reform? In response to these questions, I develop a new theoretical framework 
based on literature from global political economy, and various political and institutional 
approaches to reform. This theoretical framework focuses on the ideological motivation for 
reform, the capability to enact reform, and the opportunity to implement these reforms. I use this 
framework to examine the role of IMF conditional lending in promoting neoliberal market 
reforms around the world and how pressure from conditional lending is shaped by local political, 
economic, and institutional forces. I find that, in accordance with global political economy 
scholars, IMF conditionality plays a large role in the implementation in neoliberal market 
reforms, while ideology and capability are less impactful. I also find that economic crises do play 
xi 
 
a role in the implementation in neoliberal reforms. In general, though it seems that there is a need 
to further explore the factors that affect the adoption of reforms and a gather a more complete 
data set than what is currently available.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Starting in the 1970s and increasing during the 1980s, many countries in the global 
periphery transitioned away from statist models of development and towards neoliberal or free-
market models of development. This transition was part of a broader restructuring of the world-
economy towards globalization. The 1970s and 1980s saw the expansion of global trade and a 
radical restructuring of the world economy. Technological innovations allowed for faster 
communication and transportation of products making it easier for companies to do business on a 
global level. In order for companies, especially transnational corporations (TNCs), to maximize 
their profits, they needed to find cheaper sources for labor and goods. Consequently, these TNCs 
began deindustrializing the core and moving manufacturing to the periphery and semi-periphery, 
where low-wage labor was more readily available. This created a new division of labor (NIDL) 
where manufacturing was based largely in the periphery and to some extent, the semi-periphery 
(Frobel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980; Cantin 2010).  
This deindustrialization of the core signaled an end to the state-led development models 
that existed since the end of the Great Depression. From the 1930s through the 1980s the 
dominant development paradigm advocated for state led development programs like import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) in the periphery or the Fordism in the core countries 
(Pietrykowski 2010). Meanwhile, Soviet style command economies were well established in 
Eastern Europe and China. These state-directed development plans pushed to rapidly modernize 
and industrialize their economies through subsidizing and nurturing nascent industries while 
protecting them from foreign competition (Robinson 2014). This development strategy involved 
the expansion of state infrastructure and the movement of resources away from agriculture and 
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resource extraction to manufacturing in a process that is called import substitution 
industrialization (Kay 1989). To encourage modernization and industrialization, peripheral 
countries, with the help of international expertise and aid, expanded social and economic 
infrastructure, including education, healthcare, transportation, public administration, banking, 
communications, and electrical power.  
However, by the 1970s, Fordism and ISI were beginning to falter. As globalization 
increased and TNCs began to move manufacturing away from the core, the protectionist policies 
of the periphery were no longer desirable. TNCs wanted to be able to produce their goods 
cheaply in the periphery and then export these products to other peripheral and semi-peripheral 
countries for further processing in the global commodity chain or to core countries for sales and 
marketing. This meant that state-run enterprises (SOEs) and the protectionist policies of ISI were 
no longer beneficial for TNCs and a new development paradigm based around free-markets and 
privatization emerged. 
This new development paradigm, known as neoliberalism, gained popularity with the 
election of President Ronald Reagan in the U.S.A. and Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 
the U.K. Based on the ideas of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, neoliberalism emphasizes 
the importance of free markets and minimal state intervention for development and growth 
(Harvey 2007). First attempted in Chile after the 1973 coup d’état, neoliberal ideas quickly 
gained popularity in core countries as well as the periphery (Valdes 1995). The main policy goals 
of neoliberal development were reduction in welfare and social security spending, deregulation 
of financial markets, privatization, trade liberalization, and tax reform (Williamson 1993). By the 
late 1990s, most countries had implemented or attempted to implement some version of 
neoliberal reforms. The proliferation of neoliberalism as a development paradigm corresponded 
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to the decline of Fordism and ISI as a development paradigm. As the 1980s and 1990s wore on 
TNCs began to move more and more manufacturing to the periphery, creating the NIDL, where 
peripheral countries manufactured cheaper products for consumption in wealthier core countries, 
like the United States. 
 The emergence of neoliberalism as development policy was bolstered by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other international financial institutions (IFIs). 
Starting in the 1970s and increasing during the 1980s and 1990s these IFIs, particularly the IMF, 
championed neoliberal, free-market policies as the best development pathway for peripheral and 
semi-peripheral countries. Using what is known as “conditional lending,” the IMF and later the 
World Bank made implementing certain neoliberal policies a condition for receiving future loans 
and other financial aid. The set of neoliberal policies pursued by the IMF became codified in 
what is known as the “Washington Consensus,” a term coined by Williamson (1993). The 
Washington Consensus consists of a set of policy recommendations put forward by the US 
Treasury and its representatives in the IMF and World Bank. The Washington Consensus listed 
ten major developmental policies that included fiscal discipline, redistribution of spending away 
from subsidies, tax reform, market-based interest rate reform, exchange rate reform, trade 
liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization, financial deregulation, and secure 
property rights (Williamson, 1993).  
By the end of the 20th century, neoliberalism was the dominant policy program for much 
of the globe. Nearly every country had implemented or attempted to implement some form of 
neoliberal market reforms and the ideas espoused by followers of Friedman and Hayek were in 
the ascendency. However, neoliberalism was not without its critics and there was increasing 
criticism of the role of the IMF in promoting neoliberal policies.   
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SIGNIFICANCE OF NEOLIBERALISM IN CONDITIONAL LENDING 
The IMF is often critiqued for its role in promoting neoliberal market reforms (Peet 
2009). While the neoliberal policies outlined in the Washington Consensus were quite popular in 
the IMF, US Treasury, and among economists at the University of Chicago and other academic 
institutions, there was little evidence at the time that these policies would be effective (Harvey 
2007). In fact, since the 1980s, there is increasing research and evidence that these policies were 
not effective in achieving their goal of economic growth and stability in the adopting countries 
(Dreher 2005; Rodrik 2006). Even proponents of these policies acknowledge that these reforms 
did not achieve the desired result (Gil Diáz 2003). However, these supporters of neoliberal policy 
reform argue that IMF conditionality was not effective enough and that local political institutions 
were either too incompetent to implement reforms properly or were too adept at resisting or 
adapting conditionality to fit their own political goals (Williamson 1994).  
On the other hand, opponents of IMF conditionality and the neoliberal policies in the 
Washington Consensus argue that the policies themselves were to blame for the lack of results. 
The role of the IMF and World Bank are particularly controversial in the social sciences. For 
critics, the conditional loans provided by the IMF and World Bank were coercive and a violation 
of the national sovereignty of many countries in the global periphery (Peet 2009). Additionally, a 
substantial body of literature criticizes neoliberal market reforms and conditional lending for 
increasing inequality and poverty in many countries through reductions in social spending, wage 
stagnation, reduced union activity, and the concentration of wealth through privatization and 
financial deregulation (Bandelj and Mahutga, 2010; Connell, 2013; Oberdabernig 2013).  
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There is mounting evidence that neoliberal market reforms reduce healthcare spending 
and quality in some countries (Coburn et al., 2015; Kentikelenis et al. 2015). Moreover, 
environmental scholars argue that neoliberal market reforms are linked to environmental 
degradation as countries are pushed to lower costs for firms, leading to increased deforestation 
and pollution (Edwards, 2017; Shandra et al., 2015). Overall, there is a broad social science 
literature linking neoliberal market reforms and conditional lending, to negative societal impacts 
for the countries that undertake these reforms. The debate around the impact of neoliberal market 
reforms has resurfaced recently with the 2008 financial crisis in Europe. The financial crisis hit 
countries like Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain particularly hard forcing them to turn to 
the IMF and other multi-national lenders for support. The financial crisis renewed attention on 
IMF structural adjustment and comparisons with the neoliberal market reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s (Girón and Solorza, 2015; Greer, 2013; Hermann, 2016). While the IMF receives heavy 
criticism from its opponents for its role in spreading neoliberalism in the periphery, there is some 
debate over whether IMF conditionality was effective in getting countries in the periphery to 
implement neoliberal market reforms (Dollar and Svensson; Agnello et al. 2015a).   
The debate on the impact of conditional lending is clouded by the varied nature of 
neoliberal reforms, the inconsistent implementation of these reforms, and a lack of understanding 
of how these reforms were adopted and put into policy in the first place. It is therefore important 
to understand exactly how and why neoliberal reforms were implemented in the first place. This 
project helps clarify these debates by examining the role of the IMF in the implementation of 
neoliberal market reforms, as well as the local political and economic factors that might mediate 
the IMF’s influence. The complex nature and debate of the implementation of neoliberal market 
reforms is discussed next.  
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UNDERSTANDING CONDITIONAL LENDING 
While IMF conditionality was widely used from the 1980s onward to push the neoliberal 
market reforms outlined in the Washington Consensus, the implementation of these reforms 
varied widely, and there is a significant debate over why some countries adopted certain reforms 
and other countries did not (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes 2005; Strange 1996; Weyland 2002). 
In addition, there is debate over how influential the IMF and World Bank were in the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Peet 2009).  
Most world systems and global political economy models emphasize the role of 
multilateral lending institutions, particularly the IMF, in forcing countries to implement 
neoliberal market reforms through conditionality, trade, and other coercive power dynamics. 
World-systems and dependency scholars have a long intellectual history of analyzing how 
structural inequalities lead to uneven or unequal development (Arrighi et al 2003; Cardoso and 
Faletto 1979; Wallerstein 2004). These models argue that the adoption of neoliberal market 
reforms is largely the product of the limitations foisted by global economic structures and the 
coercion and pressure from International Financial Institutions or IFIs (Peet 2009; Stallings 
1992; Vacs 1994).  
However, there is evidence that the role of IMF conditionality and structural adjustment 
may be overstated. Research by economists on the effectiveness of IMF lending shows that 
conditional lending produced mixed results with some countries adhering to loan conditions and 
some countries repeatedly failing to meet conditions (Campos 2012; Girod and Tobin 2016). 
Dollar and Svensson (2000) found that the success or failure of structural adjustment programs 
was largely dependent on domestic political-economy variables including whether the 
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government was democratically elected, the level of political instability, fractionalism, and 
length of time an incumbent was in power. This suggests that while IMF conditionality provides 
the overarching context in which reforms take place, local political economy variables have a 
large role in determining the extent of implementation. 
 In addition, even world-systems and global political economy scholars acknowledge that 
conditional lending cannot fully explain the variation in how neoliberal market reforms are 
enacted (Smith et al. 1994; Stallings 1992). In fact, Weyland (2002) and Vreeland (2007) found 
evidence that many countries diverged or went further than what IFIs or the Washington 
Consensus recommended suggesting that countries may use IMF conditionality as a way to shift 
blame for unpopular policy decisions.  
Overall, the literature around the implementation of neoliberal market reforms is 
undecided about how influential the IMF and conditional lending was. To help clarify this debate 
I propose a new theoretical framework that incorporates how national contexts, including politics 
and institutions, mediate the impact of IMF conditionality. I contend that a framework of 
ideological motivation for reform, capability to implement reform, and the opportunity enact 
reforms will help explain the varied implementation of neoliberal market reforms in the 
periphery.  
 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
I contend that the current explanations in the literature for the implementation of 
neoliberal market reforms do not offer a complete account of the adoption of neoliberal market 
reforms from 1980 to 2005 (Agnello et al 2015b; Chang 2009; Stallings 1992: Wallerstein 2000). 
While conditional lending created a framework for reform and succeeded in limiting the policy 
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choices available, the actual implementation of neoliberal market reforms depended greatly on 
local political economy forces. Particularly, this project focuses on two main questions: 1) How 
impactful is conditional lending in getting countries to implement neoliberal market reforms? 2) 
What are the different pathways to neoliberal market reform? With the contentious debate over 
the success or failure of neoliberal market reforms and the returning focus on the role of the IMF 
after the 2008 financial crisis, it is even more important to understand how and why countries 
chose to implement these reforms.  
To answer these questions, I develop a novel framework that focuses on the ideological 
motivation for reform, the capability to enact reform, and the opportunity to implement these 
reforms. I use this framework to examine the role of IMF conditional lending in promoting 
neoliberal market reforms around the world and how pressure from conditional lending is shaped 
by local political, economic, and institutional forces.   
Ideological motivation for neoliberal market reforms can come from several places. In 
general, neoliberal market reforms during the 1970s and 1980s were predominately supported by 
conservative or right-wing governments. The ideology of the executive branch can heavily 
influence the policies governments choose to pursue Roberts and Saeed (2012). Ideological 
motivation for reform can also come from non-governmental sources. Specifically, once reforms 
have been initiated, the impetus for further reform, or the deepening of reforms, may come from 
lobbying efforts by supporters, particularly export-oriented businesses (Silva 1996).  
Even when there is an ideological motivation for reform, the government, particularly the 
executive branch, may not have the capability or political power to implement neoliberal market 
reforms. Neoliberal reforms can be quite unpopular, especially when popular subsidies and wage 
hikes are revoked. This means that governments need to have sufficient institutional strength and 
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control over governmental and civil organizations (Haggard and Kaufman 1992a; Mainwaring 
1999). This can be accomplished in two main ways; by using dictatorial powers and by 
controlling or bypassing the legislature.  
The very nature of politics means that many politicians are risk adverse. This means that 
many politicians are unlikely to adopt reforms unless the perceived risks of inaction outweigh the 
perceived cost of implementing reforms. Subsequently, even in regimes where politicians may be 
ideologically inclined towards neoliberal market reforms and are capable of enacting reforms, 
these politicians may still be reluctant to implement reforms unless circumstances provide an 
opportunity to enact these reforms (Weyland 2002). It is important to note that the term 
‘opportunity’ is used here to encompass both the opening of the political opportunity to enact 
neoliberal market reforms as well as the elimination of opportunities to adopt alternative policy 
reforms. Economic crises such as recessions, debt, or hyperinflation might push even reluctant 
politicians toward neoliberal market reforms. There is also some suggestion that some countries 
agree to IMF structural adjustment programs in order to use the IMF as an excuse or a scapegoat 
for the implementation of unpopular neoliberal market reforms. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES  
To answer these questions, I focus on three prominent neoliberal reform outcomes 
detailed in the Washington Consensus; financial liberalization, privatization, and trade 
liberalization. I chose to focus on these three as my dependent variables due to their dominance 
in the literature on market reforms as well as the availability of data on these three variables. 
Data for financial liberalization comes from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel’s (2008) New 
Database of Financial Reforms. Privatization data comes from the Privatization Database from 
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the World Bank. Data for trade liberalization comes from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
To analyze the influence of IMF conditionality I use data from (Kentikelenis, A., T. 
Stubbs, and L. King, 2016) containing information on the specific loan conditions the IMF put in 
place for each country. Local political economy variables include the strength of the executive 
branch, level of democracy, ideology of the party in power, proximity of elections, the existence 
of academic elites in government, and economic crises measured by debt, inflation, and GDP 
growth. Data for these variables comes from Polity IV, Heritage Freedom Index, Database of 
Political Institutions, and the World Development Indicators.  
This dissertation employs two different methodological techniques to answer the 
questions posed in this project; logistic and OLS regression analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA). Logistic and OLS regression analysis will allow for the 
examination of how influential each given independent variable is over many cases. In contrast, 
fsQCA allows for an examination of explanatory pathways or a combination of conditions that 
lead to a particular outcome for a smaller number of cases. In addition, fsQCA can show multiple 
explanatory pathways to the same outcome allowing for a closer examination of multiple 
causation and causal variation between cases. Using these two different techniques will allow me 
to analyze this topic from both a variable based approach as well as a case-based approach. The 
dual approach provides the opportunity to see both which variables are likely to cause more 
extensive implementation of neoliberal market reforms as well as analyze the different 
combinations of conditions lead to these more extensive reforms.  
 
CONCLUSION  
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I contend that this framework will explain the implementation of neoliberal market 
reforms in the periphery. In addition, this framework will allow me to test how influential IMF 
conditionality is and how other factors interact with IMF conditionality to lead to the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms. The results show mixed support for the theoretical 
framework developed in this dissertation. Results from regression analyses showed strong 
support for the role IMF conditionality and to a lesser extent economic crisis as factors that 
influence the likelihood of reform. Ideological motivation was well represented in the 
explanatory pathways to reform but were not significant in any of the models. Finally, capability 
factors were not significant in many of the regression models and were present in only a few of 
the explanatory pathways.  
This dissertation is broken up into the following chapters. Chapter 1 provides a 
background and history of neoliberalism and its links to IMF lending. In addition, Chapter 1 
covers the debt crisis that initiated neoliberal market reforms as well as the regional context in 
which reforms took place. Chapter 2 details the current state of research on IMF conditional 
lending and the implementation of neoliberal market reforms. Next, Chapter 3 provides a 
detailed description of the variables, data, and methods used in this study. Chapter 4 presents the 
and discusses the results from the regression analyses. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the 
results for the fsQCA methodology. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a cohesive discussion of the 
regression and fsQCA results in the context of the literature on neoliberal market reforms as well 
as the theoretical framework developed in this project and concludes with a review of the 
significant findings, limitations of the project, and potential avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE IMF AND THE NEOLIBERAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
 
 In order to understand how and why neoliberal reforms were implemented, answer the 
questions proposed in this dissertation, and analyze the new theoretical framework developed in 
this dissertation it is important to understand the history and context in which the IMF, 
neoliberalism, and conditional lending came to be. This history helps contextualize both the 
empirical facts of the reform period but also the theories and explanations that were developed 
during and after reforms began. 
 Neoliberalism, as a development paradigm, emerged during the 1970s and 1980s with 
the collapse of Fordism and ISI (Harvey 2007). This emergence was part of a broader global 
restructuring of the world-economy that took place during the 1960s-1970s. As part of this 
restructuring, TNCs needed peripheral countries deregulate and open their markets, allowing for 
the movement of manufacturing from the core to the periphery. IFIs, particularly the IMF, were 
among the tools used to help open up these peripheral countries for trade and manufacturing 
(Peet 2009).  
 This chapter reviews the history of neoliberalism in the context of the global restructuring 
that took place during the 1970s and the role of the IMF in this restructuring. First, I review the 
history of neoliberalism in the context of globalization and the world-system. Next, I examine 
the history of the IMF conditional lending and structural adjustment programs in the periphery. 
Third, I cover the codification of neoliberal development policies in the Washington Consensus 
as a foundation for IMF policy. Finally, I examine the role of IMF conditional lending in Latin 
America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. 
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NEOLIBERALISM AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE WORLD-ECONOMY 
 As noted previously, the 1970s marked a transitional moment in the world-economy. 
Prior to this, the dominant economic paradigm centered around Fordism and ISI. Fordism, 
named after Henry Ford, was a system of mass production and consumption that was dominate in 
the economies of core countries from the 1940s through 1960s (Pietrykowski 1995). Fordism 
was characterized by brutally fast-paced assembly line production where large numbers of 
unskilled and semiskilled laborers completed standardized tasks. However, while the conditions 
in these factories were brutal, Fordism also brought with its increased wages and union 
membership. The idea was that wages for factory workers needed to be high enough that workers 
could afford to buy mass-produced consumer goods. In addition, the creation of the welfare state 
provided a social safety net to keep consumerism high.  
 In contrast, the periphery and semi-periphery during this time were largely the source of 
raw materials for the industries in the core. However, starting in the 1930s, when imports of 
manufactured goods from the US and other core countries declined due to the Great Depression, 
Latin American began trying to develop their own industries and manufacturing with ISI. As the 
name suggests, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) attempted to replace foreign imports 
with locally manufactured products (Baer 1972). ISI involves strong state intervention to protect 
nascent industries including high tariffs, subsidies, and occasionally state-ownership of key 
industries. ISI was quite popular in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s when dependency 
theorists were at their height and countries took out large loans in order to help pay for this 
development (Geddes 1994). Various variations of ISI were also practiced outside of Latin 
14 
 
America, notably the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) as well as 
in India and China.  
 Fordism and ISI as economic models remained strong through the 1960s. However, 
during the 1970s and 1980s global recessions, along with advances in communication and 
transportation technologies created the conditions for countries to move away from these more 
state-centric economic models (Harvey 2007). As reach globalization increased, TNCs needed to 
find ways to incorporate these new geographic areas into their commodity chain. Rather than 
using these peripheral areas as locations for resource extraction, TNCs began to offshore many 
of the manufacturing jobs that had previously been done in the core Piet. Lower wages in the 
periphery were a major draw for TNCs and as shipping costs decreased, there was a major 
incentive to move production outside the core creating a New International Division of Labor 
(NIDL) (Mittleman 1995).  
 The NIDL however, was only viable if countries outside the core were willing to 
deregulate their economies by lowering tariffs, taxes, barriers to entry, and privatizing State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Essentially, the state-centric model of development that had existed 
since the 1930s and 1940s was no long advantageous for TNCs and core countries (Chang 2002). 
The global recession of the 1970s created a crisis for Fordism and ISI. Interest rates increased 
dramatically in the periphery and debt for many countries following ISI skyrocketed bringing to 
a halt many of the ISI and state-funded development projects. With this crisis of ISI and 
Fordism, there was now space for a new development paradigm called neoliberalism (Harvey 
2007).  
 Neoliberalism refers to both an ideology as well as a set of economic policy platforms 
that seek to reduce state intervention in the economy. Based on the work of Friedrich von Hayek 
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and Milton Friedman, neoliberalism advocated for individual freedom through the free market 
principles of neoclassical economics (Harvey 2007:20). Neoliberal economists also advocated 
for the free market as the best way to maximize economic growth, increase wealth and stability, 
and distribute resources. In general, neoliberal ideology rested on two main principles. First, 
economic growth, social institutions, and society are enhanced primarily through individuals 
with the freedom to pursue their own goals. Second, democracy, through limited government, 
was essential to this process with the government’s primary role being the preservation of private 
property rights (Von Hayek 1988). Proponents of neoliberalism argue that the market is the best 
way to distribute goods and services in a society and that government interference creates 
inefficiencies. Ideally, under neoliberalism, the government’s role in the economy is reduced to 
protecting private property, defense, law and order, and attracting investment.  
  Neoliberalism remained a fringe theory in economics until the 1970s when TNCs, seeing 
the advantages in deregulation especially in the periphery, began advocating for a switch from 
Keynesian economic policy to neoliberalism. The first country to adopt neoliberal market 
reforms was Chile, after a military coup in 1973 (Valdes 1995). Supporters of neoliberalism also 
found strong advocates in President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
elected in 1980 and 1979 respectively. The 1980s saw neoliberalism gain ground around the 
world, but especially in the United States and Great Britain, all but replacing Fordism and ISI as 
the dominate development paradigm.  
It is important to note that neoliberalism, as an ideology, is different than neoliberalism as 
a policy paradigm. While ideologically neoliberalism advocates for the retreat of state 
intervention, in reality, neoliberal policies require intense state intervention in order to 
implement. Furthermore, rather than increasing individual freedom, many neoliberal policies 
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increase corporate control of the economy and government through privatization, foreign 
investment, and increased protection of corporations from government regulation (Harvey 2007). 
Despite this inherent contradiction, neoliberal ideology became the go to replacement for 
countries looking for a new development model after the failures of Fordism and ISI. 
Neoliberalism was further promoted by TNCs who saw an opportunity to push neoliberal 
reforms during the recession and subsequent debt crises of the 1980s. 
While the global restructuring and crises of the 1970s set the stage for the rise of 
neoliberalism, TNCs still needed a way to coerce or push countries toward neoliberalism. TNCs 
along with the USA and other western democracies wanted to make sure that countries in the 
periphery did not turn to communism after the failure of ISI. For many, multi-lateral lending was 
the best way to bolster struggling economies and prevent these countries from turning to the 
USSR for aid (Peet 2009). While not initially created for this purpose, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) became the most prominent lender to countries in the global periphery. In doing so, 
the IMF became a promoter of neoliberal ideology and market reforms through conditional 
lending and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) (Vreeland 2007). Prior to the IMF’s role as 
lender of last resort and proponent of neoliberal reforms, the IMF was fast becoming irrelevant in 
the global economy. In order to understand how the IMF went from a largely unnoticed global 
institution to a prominent player in neoliberal development programs, a short history of the IMF 
is necessary.    
 
THE HISTORY OF THE IMF 
 The IMF is frequently seen as the villain for critics of neoliberal market reforms for its 
role in spreading neoliberalism (Barra and Dello Buono 2009; SAPRIN 2004; Vreeland 2002). 
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Today the IMF is known for its conditional lending and economic programs in developing 
countries. However, the IMF was originally created to stabilize international exchange rates. The 
IMF, along with what would become the World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO), 
was created in July of 1944 during the Bretton Woods conference held in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire. The Bretton Woods agreement, signed by 44 countries, sought to increase 
international economic cooperation to secure long-term peace and prosperity. The conference 
and agreement were, in part, reactions to the failure of the League of Nations to foster 
international economic cooperation after World War I (Vreeland 2007). The result of this failure 
contributed to the Great Depression and prompted governments and bankers to push for greater 
international economic cooperation.  
 
The Gold Standard and International Trade 
 The idea for creating an institution to govern the global economy was made possible by 
the disastrous inter-war period from 1919-1939. Globalization and international trade had been 
increasing since the Pax Britannica, around 1875-1919 (Peet 2009). The majority of this trade 
was between European economies with the colonies providing mostly raw materials. During this 
time, currencies and therefore trade was based on the Gold Standard. This meant that each 
country’s currency was backed by gold reserves and currencies could be freely and easily 
converted to gold. The Gold Standard made cross-border and international trade much easier by 
providing a stable basis for currency exchange while imposing balance of payments discipline on 
countries with trade deficits.  
Trade deficits occur when a country’s imports are higher in value than their exports. 
Under the gold standard, when a balance of payment deficit occurs, gold flowed from the 
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country with a trade deficit to the country with a trade surplus. This meant that the money supply 
in a country with a trade deficit would be limited as the gold reserves diminished (Peet 2009). As 
the supply of money went down, commodities, particularly imported commodities, would cost 
more and therefore demand would decrease.  Essentially, the gold standard would serve to 
automatically impose austerity on deficit countries by limiting the supply of money in that 
country.  
 However, with the advent of World War I, countries were faced with insufficient tax 
revenue due to the high cost of the war effort. This forced many countries to suspend gold 
convertibility of their currencies and print paper money as they spent more on their militaries. 
The printing of paper currency and the increasing demands of industrialization, democracy, and 
cost of the war effort meant that the gold standard was suspended repeatedly during the first 
three decades of the 20th century, resulting in sporadic episodes of high inflation and 
unemployment.  These issues were further exacerbated when, in 1929, the global economy 
crashed, and the Great Depression began.  
World War II finally brought many countries out of the Great Depression as the 
production of war materials necessitated increased employment and government spending. 
However, the failures of the previous international economic system lingered, and as the war 
neared an end 44 countries, led by the United States and Great Britain, met in Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire to discuss the future of international exchange rates and trade (Vreeland 2007). 
The result of the conference was the creation of three institutions; the IMF, World Bank, and 
WTO. The USA quickly came to dominate these three global institutions, playing an outsized 
role in the leadership and policy priorities for these institutions. 
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The Role of the IMF: 1945-1971 
 The IMF was originally created to serve as a regulatory institution for the global financial 
system. Based on classical economic liberalism, the aim was to secure the gold standard while 
allowing countries to avoid short-term pain from a balance of payment deficit. As part of this, the 
IMF was charged with monitoring borrowing countries to make sure that they maintained 
appropriate exchange rates and balance of payments.  According to Article 1 in the original 
Articles of Agreement, the IMF is tasked with six main objectives (IMF, 2016:2).   
1. To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which 
provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary 
problems. 
 
2. To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute 
thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income 
and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives 
of economic policy. 
 
3. To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among 
members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
 
4. To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current 
transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions 
which hamper the growth of world trade. 
 
5. To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily 
available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to 
correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures 
destructive of national or international prosperity. 
 
6. In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members. 
 
To join, countries deposited money with the IMF and agreed to give up some of their 
sovereign economic rights around exchange rates as well as stabilize their currency exchange 
rates and avoid devaluing their currency (Vreeland 2007). This allowed the Gold Standard to 
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continue, this time supported by the IMF, which would govern the exchange rates of member 
countries by monitoring exchange rates and providing temporary loans. In short, countries could 
draw upon their previous deposits from the IMF in order to avoid austerity caused by balance of 
payments deficits, while occasionally submitting to IMF monitoring.  
Initially, the United States was not very interested in giving up much of their newly 
acquired global power to the IMF, preferring to directly negotiate and lend to other countries. In 
fact, shortly after WWII, the United States did not use the IMF to help rebuild or lend money to 
European countries. Instead, the Marshall Plan was used to provide direct lending and support to 
Europe after WWII (Vreeland 2007). Furthermore, receiving aid money from the Marshall Plan 
was contingent on not seeking aid from the IMF. This effectively limited the IMF’s role, 
especially in Europe, during the first two decades of its existence. 
However, the IMF quickly became less involved with lending to industrialized countries 
in the core, and more interested in lending to newly industrialized or industrializing countries in 
the global periphery. As the IMF evolved, conditionality became more and more central to 
lending, particularly to countries in the global South (Barro and Lee 2005). As early as the mid-
1950s, the IMF was providing conditional loans with phases whereby future disbursement of 
funds was dependent on a country satisfactorily abiding by IMF economic conditions.  
Conditionality was a central policy goal of the United States. Other member countries 
viewed loan disbursement as an automatic right. In contrast, the US viewed IMF loans as an 
earned privilege that could be used to enforce or encourage favorable macroeconomic policies 
among member countries (Peet 2009). Due to power the US exerted over the IMF board of 
directors, the US could simply veto loans that did not comply with US desires and it became 
routine to first approach the US government for approval before approaching the IMF. 
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From 1945 through the early 1970s, conditional lending at the IMF remained limited to 
macroeconomic policies around exchange rates. These conditions were much more limited than 
the conditions that were put in place during the 1970s and especially the 1980s. This changed 
after the oil crises of the 1970s and the final collapse of the Gold Standard in 1976. 
 
The Collapse of the Gold Standard 
 Since its inception, the IMF used gold, pegged to the US dollar, as the standard for 
international transactions. During the late 1960s speculation and the devaluing of the British 
sterling saw the price of gold rise rapidly. This forced the official exchange rate for gold to rise 
from $35 an ounce to over $42 an ounce (Vreeland 2007). Even this, devaluation of the dollar 
was not enough as the price of gold quickly exceeded the official exchange rate set by the US 
and IMF. Subsequently, in 1971, the Nixon administration temporarily suspended convertibility 
of the US dollar to gold.  
 Between 1971 and 1974 several attempts were made to reimplement some version of the 
Gold Standard. However, one by one, starting with the British pound, currencies were floated, 
allowing them to fluctuate with supply and demand. By 1974, the Gold Standard, and 
subsequently the Bretton Woods system, was largely abandoned, leaving countries to either 
freely float their currencies or attempt some sort of managed or pegged float. 
 The collapse of the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods system seemed to signal the end of 
the IMF as an international regulatory body. Yet in 1976-77, Great Britain entered into a stand-
by agreement that was made conditional on cuts in public expenditures to social programs as 
well as meeting fiscal and macroeconomic targets (Harmon 1997). The IMF loan proved 
politically costly for the Labour Party and cemented the IMF as a lender of last resort for many 
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countries. Indeed, since 1977, all IMF loans have been to countries in the global periphery or 
post-communist countries.  
 
The Oil and Debt Crises 
While the 1977 loan agreement with Britain set the stage for the increased use of 
conditional lending to encourage an ever broader array of policy reforms, the oil crises of the 
1970s that marked the decline of ISI were also responsible for massively expanding the need for 
loans, especially from countries in the periphery. The oil crisis began in 1973 when the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nearly doubled the price of oil from 
$3.01 to $5.12 per barrel. By the end of 1974, oil prices had reached almost $12 dollars a barrel 
(Dietrich, 2015). Oil importing countries quickly found themselves paying much more in energy 
costs. Core countries were able to use their higher incomes and larger hard currency reserves to 
absorb the increased energy hit without incurring massive debt and inflation issues. Oil 
importing countries in the semi-periphery and periphery were much harder hit and found 
themselves faced with massive balance of payments deficits leading to massive debt and higher 
inflation.  
 On the flip side, oil exporting countries were suddenly flush with cash and in need of 
places to safely invest this money. The deficits faced by oil importing countries in the global 
periphery provided just such an opportunity. Lending from private commercial banks and other 
lenders, flush with oil money, to countries in the global periphery increased significantly during 
the 1970s. Debt in non-oil exporting peripheral countries reached $600 billion in 1982 (FDIC 
1997). Consequently, the debt of peripheral, oil importing countries exploded to such an extent 
that these countries were taking on new debt just to repay the interest on the older debt. When 
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lending banks realized this, they panicked and quickly stopped lending to these countries 
resulting in a debt crisis for countries in the periphery, but particularly Latin America. In fact, 
Latin America was so profoundly impacted by the debt crisis that the 1980s became known as 
the “lost decade.” 
 The increasing indebtedness and climbing balance of payments issues seemed to signal a 
further decline in the role of the IMF. However, as the oil and debt crises began, the IMF, under 
managing director Johannes Witteveen, set up a temporary facility for oil-importing countries 
(Peet 2009). This short-term facility, created in 1974, was accompanied by the creation of 
medium-term and long-term facilities as well. The result was that the IMF approved hundreds of 
new loans in the 1970s. Thus, the IMF was able to survive the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system by becoming a lender of last resort for the global periphery.  
 While debt rapidly increased during the 1970s for oil importing countries, the losses were 
somewhat offset by rising commodity prices. This all changed in the early 1980s. Commodity 
prices fell causing havoc for already indebted countries who were dependent on raw materials 
exports as a big part of their balance of trade. In 1982, external debt in the global periphery rose 
to almost $750 billion, over twice what it had been in 1977 (Dornbusch and Fischer 1986:837). 
Commercial lending banks stopped providing new loans and in August of 1982 Mexico 
announced it could no longer service its debts. Mexico’s default marked the true start of the debt 
crisis. 
 The IMF’s new lending strategy included conditional loans which were loans that were 
given out on the condition that countries implement certain policies and reach certain economic 
benchmarks. There was a major push from the USA to include these conditional loans in order to 
push the deregulation and “opening up” of peripheral countries (Vreeland 2007). Not only were 
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more countries subjected to monitoring and conditionality of their exchange rates and 
macroeconomic policies, but the policy areas covered by the IMF’s conditional lending also 
increased. During the 1970s, IMF conditionality emphasized exchange rate devaluation, 
liberalization of foreign exchange and imports, increased interest rates and budget cuts to control 
deficits, and increased foreign investment (Peet 2009). While still limited, IMF conditionality 
would continue to expand well into the 1980s as it took a more central role in lending and policy 
advising during the debt crises of the 1980s.  
 
THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS, NEOLIBERALISM, AND THE IMF 
 The restructuring of the global economy and the movement of manufacturing to the 
periphery and the NIDL created the space for neoliberal market-reforms to gain traction. The 
expansion of IMF conditional lending due to the oil crises and subsequent debt crises further 
helped promote neoliberal reforms and signaled a change in IMF lending policy. The IMF was 
moving away from short-term lending to industrialized core countries and towards longer-term 
lending to countries in the global periphery (Vreeland 2007). Along with this change clientele, 
the IMF expanded the list of conditions that it could apply to loans as well as increased its 
monitoring of these conditions. Furthermore, these conditions began to more closely align with 
U.S. economic interests and neoliberal ideology under the administration of President Ronald 
Reagan.   
Since its inception, the IMF had been caught between the Keynesian influences of Europe 
and the free-market neoliberal ideology of the United States. Increased globalization, the NIDL, 
and the failures of Fordism and ISI along with the oil and debt crises of the 1970s marked a 
decline in Keynesian economic policy (Harvey 2007). At the same time, neoliberalism was in the 
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ascendency in the United States and Great Britain with President Ronald Reagan taking office in 
1981 and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher taking office in 1979. Since the U.S. maintained 
veto power over IMF lending decisions the conditions that the IMF attached to its lending 
policies began to mirror the neoliberal policies supported by the U.S. and the Reagan 
administration.    
 
Neoliberalism and IMF Policy 
For much of the IMF’s history, the United States maintained veto power in the executive 
board and generally exercised great control over what loans the IMF gave and the conditions for 
these loans. In fact, it was quite normal for countries to first approach the U.S. for approval 
before going to the IMF. Subsequently, as the United States embraced neoliberalism, so did the 
IMF (Peet 2009). The IMF gradually included more and more conditions on its lending as the 
United States ramped up its pressure on countries in the global periphery to resist communism 
and embrace neoliberal free-market solutions.  
 As noted earlier, the debt crisis of the 1980s marked a real turning point in IMF 
conditional lending with the IMF increasingly lending to countries in the global periphery while 
applying much more stringent conditions on these loans. During the initial stage of the debt 
crisis, the IMF focused on providing short-term loans while working with debtor countries to 
reschedule debts in exchange for these countries implementing IMF-sponsored adjustment 
measures (Barro and Lee 2005). However, as the crisis worsened the U.S. became more heavily 
involved. Banks and other financial institutions were increasingly concerned that they would not 
be able to recoup their loans to peripheral countries and pushed the U.S. government to take a 
more proactive approach. 
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 The result was the Baker Plan, named after its primary architect, Treasury Secretary 
James A. Baker III. In 1985 Baker, worried that the debt crisis and lack of lending from 
commercial banks would trigger political crises in peripheral countries, proposed increasing the 
number of loans available to these countries from the IMF and commercial banks (Babb and 
Kentikelenis 2018). However, these loans would be conditional on the implementation of a 
number of right-wing or neoliberal policies popular at the time in Washington. These policies 
included privatization, reducing deficits, tax reductions, trade liberalization, financial 
deregulation, and increased foreign direct investment (Williamson 2003). The IMF would play 
the role of mediator between the lending banks and debtor countries and would also monitor and 
enforce conditionality as necessary. 
 The IMF immediately accepted the Baker Plan, but commercial banks were warier and 
more reluctant to lend even more of their funds to already indebted countries. The result was an 
increase in loans from the IMF and a decrease in lending from commercial banks (Babb and 
Kentikelenis 2018). While many considered the conditionality of the Brady Plan effective, the 
lack of lending and investment from private commercial banks was a problem. In addition, it 
became clear to many in Washington that new lending alone was not going to solve the debt 
crisis. Countries in the global periphery were simply too indebted and any new loans were 
simply used to pay interest on old loans without any impact on the principle of the debt. 
Subsequently, when the first Bush administration took office in 1989, the new Treasury 
Secretary, Nicholas Brady, proposed a new solution to the debt crisis, which, unsurprisingly, 
became known as the Brady Plan (Vreeland 2007).  
 Nicholas Brady argued that for highly indebted countries to escape the debt cycle, 
commercial banks and other lenders would need to compromise. Like the Baker Plan, under the 
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Brady Plan, countries agreed to implement neoliberal structural adjustment reforms. However, 
rather than receiving additional loans, under the Brady Plan, commercial banks would sharply 
reduce the amount of debt owed (Vreeland 2007). Essentially, the Brady Plan argued that the 
Baker Plan simply replaced old debt with new debt and that in order to break this cycle, the total 
amount of debt needed to be reduced. The conditions remained the same, but the reward was a 
decrease in commercial bank debt.  
 The conditions imposed under the Baker Plan and the Brady Plan were nearly identical.  
Both the Baker Plan and the Brady Plan used new loans or loan reduction as a carrot to coerce 
countries to implement neoliberal structural adjustment policies supported by the U.S., 
particularly the administrations of Reagan and Bush (Peet 2009). The IMF was tasked with 
monitoring and enforcing these policies and overtime these policies became institutionalized in 
the U.S. and IMF lending policy. Williamson (1990) coined the term ‘Washington Consensus’ to 
represent the policy paradigm that came out of the Baker and Brady Plans. The Washington 
Consensus, as described by Williamson (1993) focuses on ten economic policy reforms that 
constituted a standard structural adjustment or conditionality package; 1) fiscal discipline and the 
reduction of deficits, 2) reduction in public subsidies and redirection toward pro-growth areas, 3) 
tax reform by broadening the tax base and reducing tax rates, 4) interest rates that are market 
determined, 5) floated and competitive exchange rates, 6) trade liberalization of imports and 
reduction of tariffs, 7) liberalization of foreign direct investment, 8) privatization of state 
enterprises and programs, 9) deregulation of financial institutions and 10) banks, and the 
protection of property rights.  
 The policy prescriptions laid out in the Washington Consensus represented policies that 
neoliberal economists considered essential to the development, stability, and growth of countries 
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in the global periphery. While the policies outlined in the Washington Consensus, were enforced 
through the IMF, the ideas and policy programs came straight from advocates of neoliberalism in 
the U.S. in the form of the Baker and Brady plans. Even in cases were the Baker and Brady Plans 
did not apply or after these plans were formally retired, the IMF used variations of the policies 
outlined in the Washington Consensus for many, if not most of its conditional lending and 
structural adjustment programs during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 
 
REGIONAL VARIATION IN CONDITIONAL LENDING  
IMF conditional lending from 1980 to 2005 predominately impacted countries in the 
global periphery, particularly Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Additionally, several Eastern 
European countries adopted market reforms during the 1990s as they transitioned away from the 
policies of the former USSR. However, IMF lending was only part of the story. Global 
restructuring and economic crises and pushed many countries away from Fordism and ISI. 
Furthermore, the movement of manufacturing jobs to the periphery for low-wage labor 
incentivized countries to deregulate their economies. Either way, the result was many peripheral 
countries adopted neoliberal market reforms and moved away from more state-centric 
development policies, including import substitution industrialization (ISI) and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  Below, I provide a short, regional history of neoliberal market reforms, with 
a focus on the role of IMF conditional lending.  
 
Latin America’s Lost Decade 
The decade from 1980 to 1990 is known as the “lost decade” in Latin America. Latin 
American countries were the first to be hit by the debt crisis and were among the hardest hit by 
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the crisis. Subsequently, Latin America received most conditional loans and structural 
adjustment policies during the 1980s. The crisis began in August of 1982 when Mexico declared 
that it could no longer service its external debt, sending creditors into a panic. Latin American 
countries were particularly impacted by the oil shocks of the 1970s. The first oil shock in 1973 
left many Latin American countries with account deficits while creating account surpluses in oil-
exporting countries. Commercial banks, flush with cash from oil-rich countries, began lending 
more aggressively to Latin American countries, due to their perceived high growth potential and 
the belief that sovereign debt was a relatively safe investment. The result was that many Latin 
American countries began borrowing heavily from commercial banks at relatively low-interest 
rates. Latin American debt went from around $29 billion in 1970 to around $159 billion in 1978 
(FDIC, 1997). 
The second oil shock in 1979 further compounded the problem and by the end of 1982 
Latin American debt doubled to $327 billion (FDIC, 1997). Subsequently, when interest rates 
spiked during the early 1980s, many Latin American countries, beginning with Mexico in 1982, 
declared that they could not meet their interest payments and would be unable to service their 
debts. This caused lenders to panic and stop overseas lending while attempting to collect on 
existing loans. This further exacerbated the financial situation for Latin American countries as 
they spiraled into recessions decreasing revenue and making it even more difficult to pay back 
the debts or obtain new loans to jump-start their economies. 
The IMF stepped in and began to provide Latin American countries with short-term loans 
under the Baker Plan. However, these loans simply were used to pay for the interest of other 
loans leaving many Latin American countries even further in debt. When the Brady Plan was 
introduced many Latin American countries agreed to implement reforms in exchange for reduced 
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debt. Nevertheless, despite many Latin American countries entering into structural adjustment 
programs and conditional lending agreements with the IMF, the overall extent of implementation 
of neoliberal market reforms remains quite mixed.  
 
African Debt Crisis and Reform 
The immediate cause of the African debt crisis which preceded the adoption of structural 
reforms was related to the same structural conditions which led to the Latin American debt crisis. 
Like Latin America, the oil shocks of the 1970s led to over-lending by commercial banks and 
over-borrowing by many African countries, with similar results in the early 1980s. African debt 
grew from an average of $16.3 billion during 1970-1974 to an average of $131.2 billion during 
1980-1984 (Alemayehu 2003). However, the growth in debt varied regionally in Africa with 
North Africa (NA) showing the largest proportional increase in debt from an average $6 billion 
in 1970-174 to an average of $59.1 billion in 1980-1984. Debt in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(ESA), as well as West and Central Africa (WCA), grew significantly as well, if not quite as 
dramatically as NA. ESA debt went from an average of $5.5 billion in 1970-1974 to $35.3 
billion in 1980-1984 while WCA debt grew from an average of $4.7 billion to $36.8 billion 
during the same time period (Alemayehu 2003)  As in Latin American, the origins of the African 
debt crisis comes down to a combination of rising public expenditure by African governments 
and aggressive lending by commercial banks, in part prompted by the oil price shocks of 1973 
and 1979, along with a rise in interest rates due to recessions in industrialized countries. 
In both Africa and Latin America, the IMF stepped in to restructure debt through 
conditional lending and structural adjustment programs. However, many countries did not meet 
conditionality in both Africa and Latin America and adherence to IMF conditions was quite 
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spotty. While almost all the countries in Africa and Latin America implemented some structural 
reforms, the extent and type of reform varied from country to country. This has led a few 
scholars to debate the efficacy of conditional lending in both Latin American and Africa. 
          
Crisis and Reform in Asia 
The context and process of conditional lending and structural adjustment in East Asia 
differed significantly from Africa and Latin America. While Latin America and Africa were hit 
hard by the debt crisis, East Asian countries, especially the Asian Tigers – Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan – as well as Japan and China, weathered the 1980s debt 
crisis far better than most countries in Latin America and Africa. Subsequently, the shift toward 
neoliberalism in East Asia during the 1980s was generally much more gradual. In fact, many 
East Asian countries embraced export-oriented development models well before other countries 
in the global south. 
However, in 1997, after months of currency speculation that depleted Thailand’s foreign 
reserves, the country devalued its currency relative to the dollar and allowed its currency to float 
against the dollar. This caused a free-fall for Thailand’s currency, stock market, and property 
markets that quickly spread to other parts of Asia (Yamazawa 1998). Thailand, Indonesia, and 
South Korea were the hardest hit although Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines were 
also hurt. China, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Japan were also affected.  
The Asian crisis came just as the IMF and other neoliberal advocates were claiming 
victory in Latin America and Africa. Furthermore, Asian countries were viewed as having 
developed in the “right way” according to free-market advocates. Despite these criticisms, the 
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IMF proceeded with a series of bailouts tied to loan conditionality and neoliberal policy reforms 
for the most heavily impacted countries.  
  
Central and Eastern European Transitions 
Most of the structural reforms in Central and Eastern Europe began in the 1990s after the 
fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. Between 1989 and 1991 the Soviet Union disintegrated leaving 
many Central and Eastern European countries to fend for themselves. Western economists 
recommended that the former Soviet Bloc countries rapidly adopt neoliberal market or structural 
reforms, including liberalization, stabilization, and especially privatization.  Pro-market reform 
economists argued that the collapse of communism provided an opportunity for politicians and 
policymakers to enact structural reforms if the acted quickly before workers and middle 
managers could strengthen their position and block reforms, especially privatization. (Lipton et 
al. 1990: 297-299). However, most of the countries fared poorly over the following decade, with 
GDP and per capita income falling precipitously (Hamm et al. 2012).  
The struggles of these Central and Eastern European countries to transition away from 
Soviet-style communism to Western capitalism is still a contentious issue for policymakers and 
academics.  Proponents of rapid the neoliberal structural reforms argue that without this shock 
therapy, economic performance would be even worse, while supporters of a more gradualist 
approach contend that slowing down the process of reform would have given governments, 
businesses, and people more time to adjust and would have prevented the corruption and 
economic problems that followed (Chong and López-de-Silanes 2005; Gil Diaz 2003). 
 
CONCLUSION 
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 The role of the IMF in the implementation of neoliberal market reforms occurs within the 
broader context of global restructuring during the 1970s. As the global economy globalized and 
moved away from more state-centric approaches, particularly ISI and Fordism, neoliberalism 
was well positioned to become the next economic development paradigm. Supported by global 
powers in the form of the USA and the UK, neoliberalism quickly became a major policy 
position of the IMF and its conditional lending program. However, the IMF was not the only 
pressure exerted on peripheral countries to get them to deregulate.  
The failure of ISI made state-centric models less appealing and the increasing NIDL 
pushed peripheral countries towards a ‘race to the bottom’ in order to get low-wage 
manufacturing jobs from TNCs. While some countries in Asia and Europe, seemed to whether 
this transition well, many countries were forced to resort to the IMF and other lenders of last 
resort in order to service their debts. While there is some debate of how influential the IMF really 
was during this process, there is no argument that the IMF conditional lending was an omni-
present reality for many countries in the periphery. The next chapter reviews the important 
literature and theories that attempt to explain the implementation of neoliberal market reform as 
well as lay out my own theoretical framework.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
EXPLAINING NEOLIBERAL REFORMS 
 
The literature around the implementation of neoliberal market reforms can be broadly 
categorized into two basic categories; explanations emphasizing the role of external forces in 
coercing countries into implementing reforms (Wallerstein 2004; Arrighi et al. 2003; Chang 
2002) and explanations highlighting the role of local politics, institutions, and economic factors 
in reform (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Agnello et al 2015b). While these two explanations are not 
mutually exclusive and both explanations are generally considered in the literature, there does 
not exist a cohesive theoretical framework that explains how these two literatures interact. 
Furthermore, there is a tendency to emphasize, and perhaps over emphasize, the role of the IMF 
over more local factors, especially among global political economy scholars and critics of the 
IMF. Particularly, this project asks: 1) How impactful was conditional lending in getting 
countries to adopt neoliberal market reforms? 2) What were the different pathways to neoliberal 
market reforms? Subsequently, I propose a new theoretical framework to explain the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms that systematically incorporates both external and 
internal explanations for reforms while testing the influence of IMF conditional lending.  
 This new theoretical framework contends that a given country’s likelihood of 
implementing neoliberal market reforms is largely determined by three main factors; 1) an 
ideological motivation for reform, 2) the capability to implement reform, and 3) an opportunity 
to enact said reform. Ideological motivation is primarily conceptualized as the political ideology 
of the executive branch as well as the ideological pressure exerted by export-oriented businesses. 
Capability is conceptualized as the ability of the executive branch to implement desired reforms 
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through controlling the legislature through dictatorial powers or electoral control. In contrast, a 
government’s capability will be hampered if they have a fragmented or if opposition groups 
possess veto power in legislation or the courts. Finally, opportunity is conceptualized as 
exogenous factors that might limit or empower the adoption of reforms. Specifically, countries 
that are experiencing economic crises, elections, or are subject to IMF conditionality will have 
improved opportunities to enact neoliberal market reforms.   
This chapter details the theories and literature around IMF conditionality and 
neoliberalism as a development policy. First, I survey the theoretical approaches to neoliberalism 
and IFIs provided by the global political economy literature, including dependency theory and 
the world-systems approach. Next, I review the political institutional literature on policy reform, 
the IMF, and crises. Third, I examine the literature on the effectiveness of IMF policy by 
economists, many of whom work for the IMF and the World Bank. Finally, I discuss the gaps in 
these literatures and elaborate on how the various explanations fit with my conceptual 
framework of ideological motivation, capability, and opportunity. 
 
THE NEOLIBERAL CONTROVERSY   
The global restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s caused significant changes in how 
countries, particularly in the periphery, approached development. The transition away from ISI 
to a neoliberal model of development, as outlined in the Washington Consensus, represented a 
significant rupture in the global development paradigm (Chang 2002; Wallerstein 2004). This 
shift from state-led development towards free-market based policies, including privatization, 
trade liberalization, financial deregulation, social spending cuts, tax reform, and increased 
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foreign investment was not without controversy (Williamson 2003; Peet 2009). Furthermore, 
critics of these policies point to the role of the IMF as particularly contentious.   
While the neoliberal development model pursued by the IMF and other supporters was 
supposed to improve the long-term stability and growth for countries in the global periphery, the 
actual results of conditionality and neoliberal reforms are widely criticized. Critics of 
neoliberalism and IMF conditionality argue that these policies lead to increased inequality, 
instability, and reduced sovereignty (Barra and Dello Buono 2009; Oberdabernig 2010; Peet 
2009; SAPRIN 2004). Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) found that participation in IMF SAPs 
and conditionality lowers growth rates for the duration of the program and even after countries 
abandon IMF SAPs, their growth remains lower than it would have without participation. In 
addition, global political economy scholars argue that the global restructuring and neoliberal 
reforms create a “race to the bottom” that forces peripheral countries to compete to be the lowest 
cost and least regulated place of business. This meant limiting workers’ wages and unionization 
while deregulating trade, banking, financial institutions, and privatizing SOEs.  
Even original proponents of conditionality and neoliberal reforms acknowledge that these 
policies have not achieved the desired results (Arpac, Bird, and Madilaras 2008; Alesina and 
Drazen 1991). However, these scholars contend that the failure of these reforms is due to a lack 
of buy-in and follow through from national political leaders. Gil Diaz (2003) maintains that the 
perceived failures of market reforms, especially in Latin America, are misconceptions. Instead, 
he argues that most of the policies that were put in place were in fact “not even a pale imitation 
of what market economics ought to be,” (Gil Diaz 2003:7). Furthermore, Chong and López-de-
Silanes (2005) contend that the failures privatization in Latin America are primarily due to poor 
planning and incomplete privatization rather than issues with privatization itself.  
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This debate highlights the need to understand the causes of neoliberal market reform. 
Supporters of neoliberal ideology argue that reforms can and should work if local politicians and 
administrators only had the willpower to adopt and follow through with these reforms (Chong 
and López-de-Silanes 2005; Williamson 1994). Meanwhile, opponents contend that neoliberal 
reforms were unsuccessful and created inequality and economic hardship due to the nature of the 
reforms themselves and the pressure exerted from external sources (SAPRIN 2004; Peet 2009; 
Wallerstein 2004). In essence, the debate around the effectiveness of neoliberal market reforms 
is complicated by disagreements in how neoliberal market reforms are implemented. Are 
neoliberal market reforms hindered by local resistance or incompetence or are reforms foisted on 
countries through external means (IMF) thereby limiting the sovereignty of local or national 
governments? In order to understand the implications and consequences of neoliberal reforms it 
is therefore important to understand how these reforms were implemented in the first place.   
The heated debate over the impacts of IMF conditionality and neoliberal market reforms 
is further obscured by the inconsistent implementation of these reforms. Some countries 
implemented reforms earlier than others, with Chile being the first. In addition, some countries 
implemented reforms under strict IMF guidelines while others did most of the reform on their 
own (Klein 2008; Oberdabernig 2017; Valdes 1995). The IMF’s role was to monitor and enforce 
the conditionality attached to SAPs and ensure that local politicians and institutions followed 
through with the agreed upon reforms. However, even among countries that implemented 
reforms under IMF, conditionality was not uniformly enforced, and as such, the implementation 
of neoliberal policies was also far from uniform.  
Using literature from the global political economy perspective, the political institutional 
perspective, as well as literature on the effectiveness on IMF conditionality, I examine the role of 
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IMF conditionality in the implementation of neoliberal market reforms in the global periphery.  
Focusing on three main policy reforms detailed in the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal 
development paradigm – privatization, trade liberalization, and financial deregulation – I contend 
that the role of IMF conditionality in the implementation of neoliberal market reforms is 
somewhat exaggerated in the global political economy literature. Instead, I argue that the while 
IMF conditionality plays a major role in the implementation neoliberal reforms, the adoption of 
these reforms requires an ideological motivation among local politicians and institutions towards 
neoliberalism as well as the capability to pass policies that implement these reforms.  
 
THE IMF AND NEOLIBERALISM FROM GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
 Neoliberalism, as a development strategy, was, in part, a response to the state-led 
development strategies which emerged in the decade after World War II.  These state-led 
development strategies, including import substitution industrialization (ISI), were based on 
dependency theory (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Dependency theory was, in turn, a criticism of 
modernization theory which argued that countries and societies “developed” through similar 
stages as they adopted more modern attitudes, cultures, practices, and technology (Lipset 1959; 
Smelser 1999). Dependency theorists argued that “underdeveloped” or peripheral countries were 
not simply primitive versions of “developed” or core countries. Instead dependency scholars 
argued that peripheral countries were exploited and kept dependent on core countries through 
unequal exchange and imperialist exploitation (Bodenheimer 1971; Frank 1967). Many 
dependency theorists advocated for protectionist trade policies and ISI as the best policies to 
break this cycle of underdevelopment (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). As global restructuring began 
creating the NIDL and as the economic and debt crises of the 1980s grew in the global periphery, 
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particularly in Latin America, ISI and state-led development struggled under heavy debt burdens. 
Increasingly desperate leaders turned away from the ideas of dependency theory and towards 
neoliberal ideology of deregulation, free-markets, and export-oriented economies.  
 The central ideas of dependency theory did not disappear, however. The central tenant of 
dependency theory, unequal exchange, was refined and reinvigorated with the formulation of the 
world-systems approach (Emmanuel 1972; Amin 1976). The world-systems perspective 
advocates for a macro-scale approach to social change and economic relationships. From this 
perspective, the capitalist world-system is a unit of analysis with a single division of labor, 
whereby countries are dependent on economic exchange with other countries without sharing a 
common political structure or culture (Wallerstein 1974: 390). This division of labor divides 
countries – and potential regions and cities –into core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral countries 
such that core countries can dominate the semi-peripheral and peripheral countries and the semi-
peripheral countries are able to exploit the peripheral countries (Wallerstein 2004). Furthermore, 
each cycle or time period dominated by a hegemon that can temporarily control the economic 
and ideological components of the world-system (Wallerstein 2004). 
This leads to a system where core and semi-peripheral countries can “develop” by 
exploiting or “under-developing” peripheral – and in the case of core countries – semi-peripheral 
countries (Frank 1967; Frank 1978). At the end of World War II, the United States emerged as 
the dominant power in the capitalist world-system. Starting with the Bretton Woods system, and 
its subsequent derivations, the United States sought to maintain its place as the dominant core 
country through economic control and military intervention. One of the major mechanisms 
through which the United States attempted to maintain its position was through the institutions 
created under the Bretton Woods system; the World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the 
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International Monetary Fund (Holman 1984; Pfister and Suter 1987). By controlling who got aid 
and the conditions under which loans and aid was given, the United States was able to coerce and 
incentivize countries to implement favorable economic policies. This became especially 
important during the Cold War and during the global restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s.   
 
The Role of the IMF in the World-System 
Most of the literature and scholarly work on the IMF and its role in the global political 
economy is focused on the consequences of IMF structural adjustment or conditional lending 
rather than an empirical examination of its role in the actual implementation of reforms (Saad-
Filho and Johnston 2005; Babb 2005). Many world-system and global political economy 
scholars take the role of the IMF in the implementation of neoliberal reforms as a given. 
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that neoliberal reforms and IMF conditionality have strong 
negative effects on growth and inequality in countries which undertook structural adjustment 
(Emeagwali 2011; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000). However, world-systems and global political 
economy approaches can provide useful insights into how IMF conditionality impacts the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms. 
From a world-systems perspective, the implementation of neoliberal market reforms has 
its basis in the restructuring of the global economy during the 1970s and 1980s as discussed in 
the prior chapter. The debt crises that occurred during this time were part of a crisis of capitalism 
as the world-economy expanded (Wallerstein 2000). This approach contends that while state 
capacity is important to a certain extent, the economic policies of peripheral countries are largely 
linked to the structural inequality inherent in the global capitalist system (Arrighi et al. 2003; 
Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Wallerstein 2004). From this 
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perspective, the mounting debt in the periphery served as a useful device to coerce countries into 
adopting neoliberal market reforms that were more favorable to the interest of TNCs and the core 
countries in which they were based. For many scholars and critics, the IMF and conditional 
lending was the main instrument used by TNCs and the United States to pressure the periphery 
into adopting neoliberal market reforms (Peet 2009; Chang 2003; Vacs 1994). Chang (2009) 
argues that the policies included in IMF conditionality are not designed to “develop” these 
countries, but instead served to reshape these countries into centers for low-wage manufacturing 
and maintain a relationship of dependency and exploitation between peripheral and core 
countries.  
In addition, there is evidence to suggest that a country’s position in the world-system as 
well as their relationship with the United States and other core countries impacts the strictness of 
IMF conditionality. Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2015) found that countries with membership 
on the UN Security Council received, on average, 30 percent fewer conditions. This suggests, it 
seems likely that countries that are less influential on the global stage are more likely to undergo 
IMF conditionality and receive more conditions. Furthermore, countries with more IMF 
conditions will be more likely to adopt neoliberal market reforms. Finally, IMF programs with 
explicit conditions regarding privatization, trade liberalization, and financial deregulation make 
the adoption of these specific reforms more likely.  
 
Global Antecedents to IMF Conditionality and Neoliberal Reform 
World-systems scholars contend that transnational corporations (TNCs) from core 
countries are in control of extensive global commodity chains from raw resource extraction to 
processing, shipping, marketing, and selling. This forces poorer countries, particularly peripheral 
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countries into taking lower-value positions in the global commodity chain (Bair and Mahutga 
2016).  These positions lead to many low-wage, low-capital intensive jobs that are predominately 
export driven. The poor countries’ position in these commodity chains makes them largely 
dependent on core countries for a market for their exports as well as capital and jobs. In addition, 
Chang (2002) argues that core countries have forced peripheral and semi-peripheral countries 
into trade relationships that damage the poorer countries’ infant industries and force them into 
lower-wage lower-skilled production for export. These exporting countries bear more of the 
costs of exporting, particularly raw resource exports, while receiving less of the revenue (Bunker 
and Ciccantell 2005). The resulting trade imbalances make these countries more likely to become 
indebted or be influenced by global crises and therefore more likely agree to IMF conditionality.  
Global economic crises like the oil crises of the 1970s and the debt crises of the 1980s 
and 1990s pushed many countries to participate in IMF conditionality and SAPs (Felix 1990; 
Stallings and Kaufman 1989). External debt – from trade imbalances, poor planning, or an 
economic crisis – is the primary vehicle the IMF uses to get countries to enter into conditional 
lending and SAPs (Peet 2009; Stallings 1992). Using the debt of poorer countries to persuade 
them to implement neoliberal reforms is a common IMF practice. This in turn, moves 
sovereignty away from these states and toward core countries and the IMF (Peet 2009). Strange 
(1996) argues that financialization and technological advancements moved power away from 
these poorer states and towards markets where IFIs are moral authorities. The result is that 
political leaders’ policy choices are limited through both the structure of the international 
economy as well as pressure from IFIs, especially the World Bank and IMF. Subsequently, we 
would expect that countries with higher multi-lateral debt would be more likely to agree to IMF 
conditionality and therefore more likely to implement neoliberal market reforms. 
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Overall, the global political economy literature suggests that countries that are facing 
large external debts or multi-lateral debts will be more likely to resort to IMF conditional 
lending. Subsequently, countries that undergo IMF conditionality will be more likely to 
implement neoliberal market reforms. In addition, countries with exports as a large proportion of 
their economy will be more likely to implement neoliberal market reforms in order to continue to 
compete in the global market. Contrastingly, countries with lower exports to GDP and/or closer 
political ties to the US will undergo less IMF conditionality and should therefore be less likely to 
implement neoliberal market reforms and any reforms that are adopted will be less extensive.  
 
LOCAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Global political economy models emphasize the role of trade imbalances, global 
economic crises, and global power dynamics in creating opportunities for the IMF and other IFIs 
to coerce peripheral countries into implementing neoliberal market reforms (Chang 2003; 
Stallings 1992; Vacs 1994; Wallerstein 2004). While most scholars readily acknowledge the role 
of IMF conditionality and global pressures to reform, there is a substantial literature from 
economists and political scientists that emphasizes how local political, economic, and 
institutional factors respond to and interact with IMF conditionality and influence the actual 
implementation of these neoliberal market reforms (Agnello et al. 2015b; Dollar and Svensson 
2000: Haggard and Kaufman 1995: Chap. 6; Roberts and Saeed 2012). 
This divide illustrates the different explanatory and normative frameworks for addressing 
development in peripheral countries (Gore 2000). World-systems and global political economy 
scholars argue for a macro-level or global explanation for the implementation of neoliberal 
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market reforms. In contrast many economists and political scientists offer a more national or 
meso-level explanation of reform, closely tied to local or regional factors. 
Stallings (1992) acknowledges that while markets and leverage play a role in limiting 
policy choices available, policy makers still make most of the decisions. External pressure and 
structural constraints cannot fully explain how and when neoliberal market reforms are 
implemented or the variation in which countries implement reforms (Smith et al. 1994). Indeed, 
Weyland (2002) notes that parts of the neoliberal market reforms in Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and 
Venezuela diverged or went further than what IFIs or Washington Consensus recommended. 
Additionally, Vreeland (2007) suggests that countries may use IMF and World Bank conditional 
lending to implement desired reforms while shifting blame to these IFIs.  
 
National Economic Factors 
 There is a substantial literature on the role of crises and reforms in the implementation of 
neoliberal market reforms. While it is generally agreed that many of the crises experienced by 
peripheral countries are global in origin, the national impacts of these crises as well as the 
responses to these crises vary on a national level. Crises, particularly economic crises, can 
provide opportunities for pro-reform forces to enact policies over political and civil opposition 
(Agnello et al. 2015b; Klein 2008). Rational choice models contend that crises force politicians 
and policy makers into enacting neoliberal market reforms as their other options become less 
viable (Drazen and Grilli 1993; Haggard and Kaufman 1995: Chap. 6; Rodrik 1992). 
Furthermore, crises may increase the public perception of the need for reforms (Williamson 
1994). In general, politicians are unlikely to support or attempt neoliberal market reforms or 
follow through with IMF conditionality when the economy is doing well because the short-term 
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political risks outweigh the potential for benefits down the line. Crises change this political 
calculation, either by providing the opportunity for ideological reformists or by limiting the 
options and increasing the risks of non-action for politicians. 
Crises in the form of recessions, hyperinflation, currency and fiscal imbalances, and debt, 
may remove obstacles to reform and provide incentives for policy changes (Drazen and Easterly 
2001; Nelson 1990). Public opposition to reforms is one reason why politicians may be reticent 
to implement neoliberal market reforms. Accordingly, Williamson (1994) suggests that crises 
increase the public’s perception of the necessity of reforms, making politicians more willing to 
adopt reforms. When faced with crises, politicians, who are relatively risk adverse, may become 
bolder and more willing to accept political risks (Weyland 2002). Klein (2008) argues that 
shocks, including political and economic crises create opportunities for reformers to push 
through pro-market or neoliberal reforms. 
Despite the broad support for the crisis-induced reform hypothesis, the empirical results 
are mixed. Part of the difficulty is that the crisis-induced reform hypothesis is tautological: if 
reforms have not been implemented it is because the crisis is not bad enough. Rodrik (1996: 27) 
argues that a crisis is an extreme form of policy failure and reform only becomes an issue when 
currently policies are not working, making the crisis-induced-reform hypothesis difficult to 
falsify. Additionally, crises of one kind or another were extremely common during the period 
when many neoliberal market reforms and structural reforms took place. The result is that crises 
function as more of an underlying or necessary condition for reform rather than a direct cause or 
a sufficient condition.  
Nevertheless, many scholars examine the role of economic crises and neoliberal market 
reforms. In a study of Sub-Saharan Africa, Adams and Mengistu (2008), found support for high 
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inflation as a determinant of privatization. There is also evidence that high government debt 
increases the chances of privatization, particularly in developing countries where the sales from 
privatization may be used to pay off this debt (Bortolotti and Pinotti 2003). Roberts and Saeed 
(2012) found that economic factors, including crises, played a limited role in privatization with 
most privatization activity taking place in countries with relatively stable economic performance. 
Moreover, Roberts and Saeed (2012) argue that crises may make it more difficult to privatize as 
foreign investors are more reticent to invest in countries with economic instability. 
There is also evidence that the type of crisis can both spur and curtail financial 
deregulation. Abiad and Mody (2005) found that balance of payments crises increased the 
likelihood of financial liberalization while banking crises reduced the likelihood of reform.  
Agnello et al (2015a) concluded that external debt crises are the main determinant of reforms in 
finance in banking while inflation and economic recessions were vital to stimulating consensus 
for reforms.  
For trade liberalization, Bruno and Easterly (1996) found support for high inflation as 
potential cause for reforms. Using yearly data on a large sample of both developed and 
developing countries Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006) found that countries were more likely 
to adopt reforms after a crisis, when a new government takes office, and when the government 
has a large majority and faces less opposition. However, Campos et al. (2010) found evidence 
that political crises seem to have more impact on trade liberalization than economic crises. In 
general, it seems likely that privatization, trade liberalization, and financial deregulation have 
diverging causes in terms of economic crises. Overall, the literature suggests that crises, 
particularly recessions, debt, and inflation, are likely precursors to IMF conditionality or SAPs 
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which would increase the likelihood of reform, yet also present an obstacle to certain types of 
reform depending on the crisis.  
 
Local Political and Institutional Factors 
 While most scholars agree that macro-economic conditions and pressure from the IMF 
and World Bank do play some role in countries adopting neoliberal market reforms, political 
scientists and economists who study the effectiveness of IMF conditionality suggest that national 
politics and institutions are very instrumental in explaining the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Agnello et al 2015b). There is also some evidence to 
suggest that more conservative governments are much more likely to follow through with IMF 
conditionality and may even go further than IMF policy advises. Roberts and Saeed (2012) find 
evidence that in peripheral countries, right wing governments are correlated with privatizations 
while in Eastern Europe, no such relationship exists.  
 Even in countries where the government is ideologically inclined to accept the reforms 
imposed through IMF conditionality, implementation is not guaranteed. Governments are only 
able to enact neoliberal market reforms when they have enough institutional strength and control 
over governmental and civil organizations (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 1999). 
Evidence suggests that political fractionalization and fragmentation delays the implementation of 
reforms and reduces the likelihood of reform adoption (Alesina et al. 2006). Indeed, Bortolotti 
and Pinotti (2008) found that political fragmentation, characterized by democracies with a large 
number of political parties, delays privatization. Smith et al. (1994) contend that a powerful 
executive branch capable of controlling both political and popular opposition and prevent 
fragmentation will increase the likelihood and extent of neoliberal market reforms. Furthermore, 
48 
 
presidents or executives with more political clout might be better able to persuade other political 
actors and social groups to accept the costs of neoliberal market reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 
1995). 
 Additionally, there is debate over the effect of democracy on the implementation of 
neoliberal market reforms and adherence to IMF conditionality. While a dictatorship or 
autocratic government might be more willing to oppress opposition to reform, there is evidence 
that democratic countries are more likely to adopt reforms (Stallings and Kaufman 1989). A 
government that has the legitimacy of being an established democracy may find it easier to 
impose the costs of neoliberal market reforms than a newer, more fragile, democracy (Campos, 
Hsiao, and Nugent 2010; Joyce 2006). In addition, the “honeymoon hypothesis” argues that 
democratic regimes are more likely to implement reforms shortly after an election when support 
is highest (Williamson 1994). However, Arpac et al. (2008) found no evidence that election 
timing was significant in the adoption of reforms.  
   
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL CASE STUDIES 
 In a simplistic sense, IMF conditionality serves as recommendation, albeit a 
recommendation tied to desperately needed resources, that countries can choose to follow or not. 
The extent to which these recommendations are adopted and implemented vary depending on a 
variety of national political and economic factors. However, the exact relationship between these 
factors is not fully understood. There is not a consensus as to how influential IMF conditionality 
is or how national political and economic factors influence adoption of neoliberal market 
reforms.  
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The research on IMF conditionality and neoliberal market reforms that best incorporates 
both national-level and global political economy factors generally uses small-n case-studies 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Teichman 1996; Williams 2001). Most of these case 
studies focus on Latin America to explain the rapid transition from ISI to neoliberal development 
policies. For example, Weyland (2002), used cross-case comparisons of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
and Venezuela to analyze the way political leaders make the decision to implement neoliberal 
market reforms. He argues that the adherence to IMF conditionality in these four countries was 
so inconsistent that it is unlikely that conditionality was very effective. Instead, Weyland (2002) 
contends that leaders implemented reforms when crises made the cost of non-action greater than 
the cost to adopt neoliberal market reforms. In general, there is some consensus that although 
IMF conditionality played a significant role in pushing Latin American countries to adopt 
neoliberal reforms, there were quite a few other factors that were also significant.  
Case-studies evaluating the implementation of neoliberal market reforms outside of Latin 
American are less common but still widespread9 (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2002; Kaufman 2007; 
Quadir 2000; Kovàcs 1994). Quadir (2000) argues that General Ziaur Rahman used IMF 
conditionality and neoliberal market reforms to consolidate power in Bangledesh by giving 
control of these reforms to allies and buying off potential opponents through discounts on 
privatizations and other corrupt behavior. In an analysis of the adoption of market reforms in 
Korea, Kalinowski (2009) contends that these reforms were successful because the deviated from 
the conditions laid out by the IMF, namely a slower enactment of reforms and the 
implementation of broader social welfare programs to absorb the costs of reform. The IMF in 
these cases is seen as a precursor to reforms rather than the direct cause of reforms.  
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For other regions, results among case-studies are also mixed. Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2002) 
notes that privatization in sub-Saharan Africa varied widely between countries and while 
external aid was often the precursor to reforms it was not the most significant factor. There is 
also a whole case-study literature that examines Eastern-European transition after the fall of the 
Soviet Union (Kaufman 2007; Kovács 1994; Lipton et al. 1990). The analyses of the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms in former communist countries is quite different 
from that of Latin America, Africa, and Asia due to influence of the Soviet Union in many 
Eastern European countries with greater emphasis placed on national political institutions.  
While these case studies provide valuable insight into the causes of neoliberal market reforms 
and the role of IMF conditionality, they are not very generalizable beyond the specific cases 
being examined. At best, some cross-case comparisons might provide insights into similar 
countries in the same region and occasionally between regions. However, most case-studies are 
going to lack broader external validity.  
 
PURPOSE OF THIS PROJECT AND HYPOTHESES 
 The purpose of this project is to construct a theoretical framework that brings together 
and bridges the gaps between the various literatures on implementation of neoliberal market 
reforms. Using this framework, this project analyses how IMF conditionality is mediated by 
local political and economic factors. In addition, this project includes a larger number of 
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries with the goal of providing more generalizable results 
while accounting for regional variation in reform implementation. I argue that the impact of IMF 
conditionality is largely mediated by local political and economic factors that influence a 
government’s ideology, opportunities, and capability to implement reform.  
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 While IMF conditionality does vary slightly from country to country, the main objectives 
for these conditions remain remarkably consistent. Moreover, many of the crises of the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s created similar economic issues for countries, especially countries within a 
given geographic region. However, while many countries adopted some neoliberal market 
reforms while under IMF conditionality, the extent of implementation varied greatly from 
country to country.  This suggests that factors other than conditionality are accounting for this 
variation. I contend that countries are likely to implement reforms and adopt more extensive 
reforms when there is an ideological motivation for reform, the political and institutional 
capability to implement reforms, and when crises and external pressure provide leaders and 
proponents with the opportunity to enact reforms.   
 
Ideological Motivation for Reform  
 Neoliberal market reforms are unlikely to take place, even with IMF conditionality, if 
local political actors are not ideologically driven to enact neoliberal market reforms. Countries 
where leaders are ideological opposed to neoliberalism or view the IMF as a threat to their 
national sovereignty are more likely to resist reforms even if they agree to IMF conditionality. In 
contrast, countries where the leadership is more amenable to neoliberalism will be less likely to 
resist conditionality and may even use conditionality as an excuse to implement more extensive 
reforms than required by the IMF (Roberts and Saeed 2012). Furthermore, countries where 
exports make up a larger portion of GDP should be more open, ideologically, to neoliberal 
market reforms as business interests lobby and push for reforms that will help exports and trade 
liberalization. 
52 
 
Hypothesis 1: Countries with leaders that share ideological values with neoliberal market 
reforms, specifically right-of-center politicians, will be more likely to implement neoliberal 
market reforms with or without IMF conditionality. 
 
Capability to Pass Reform Legislation 
 Even where the ideological motivation to adopt neoliberal market reforms exist, leaders 
still need to be able to pass these reforms over opposition from other interests and groups. This 
means that political leaders seeking to enact neoliberal market reforms must have the capability 
to actual get these policies passed. The literature from political scientists and economists suggest 
that countries with more autocratic governments, with their ability to suppress opposition, will be 
more capable of enacting neoliberal market reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 
1999). In democracies, political fragmentation, or lack of unity in government, makes it more 
difficult to enact reforms. Specifically, if an executive’s party is able to get control of the 
legislative branch it is much easier to implement reforms and in contrast a divided government 
can make reform legislation much more difficult to enact (Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi 2006; 
Grier, Lin, and Ye 2015). 
Hypothesis 2: Executives with more control over the legislative branches, through autocratic 
government or more unified government, will be more capable of following through with IMF 
conditionality and implement more extensive neoliberal market reforms.  
  
Opportunity to Enact Reforms 
 The term “opportunity” used here, encompasses both the opening of the political 
opportunity to enact neoliberal market reforms as well as the elimination of opportunities to 
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adopt alternative policy reforms. When governments have the motivation and capability to enact 
neoliberal market reforms, they may still be reluctant to implement these reforms for fear of the 
political costs. In order for reforms to be adopted, political leaders must feel that the political 
costs are minimal, or at least smaller than cost of inaction. On the flip side, external conditions 
may pressure or push leaders towards reforms that they normally would not consider as other 
policy options are taken away. Subsequently, many political leaders will attempt to implement 
potentially unpopular reforms immediately after an election when newly elected leaders are at 
their most popular and future elections are still distant (Williamson 1993).  
Hypothesis 3: Politicians will be more likely to adopt neoliberal market reforms shortly after an 
election. 
IMF conditionality may serve as both an external pressure to reform and an excuse to 
carry out reforms. Pressure from the IMF may serve as to constrict or limit the options for 
politicians, pushing them toward neoliberal market reforms (Peet 2009). In contrast, political 
leaders may use the excuse of IMF conditionality to enact reforms that were already desired, 
shifting the blame from politicians to the IMF (Vreeland 2007). Either way, IMF conditionality 
can provide an impetus to reform, either by limiting the policy options available to politicians or 
by providing a convenient excuse for politicians to enact desired reforms.  
Hypothesis 4: Politicians will be more likely to adopt reforms when there is increased pressure 
from the IMF in the form of IMF conditionality.    
Political leaders may also implement reforms out of fear or lack of options. This is 
particularly relevant when looking at debt and economic crises of the 1980s. Political leaders 
should be more likely to implement neoliberal market reforms when faced with economic crises, 
particularly high debt, hyperinflation, or a recession. As the cost of inaction becomes more than 
54 
 
the political costs of enacting neoliberal market reforms politicians who were once reticent, may 
feel that implementing reforms is the best option (Weyland 2002).  
 Nevertheless, neoliberal market reforms are sometimes adopted even in countries where 
political leaders are not ideologically inclined toward neoliberalism or are faced with a divided 
government and political fragmentation. In these cases, I argue that a combination of economic 
crises along with specific IMF conditions can cause countries to enact neoliberal market reforms. 
During an economic crisis, the IMF will have more power to convince reluctant leaders to accept 
conditionality and will have more power to monitor reforms and hold leaders accountable 
(Stallings 1992). However, in these cases reforms should adhere to the conditions outlined in the 
IMF conditionality agreement such that conditions that concern privatization should lead to more 
privatization, conditions that govern trade liberalization should decrease tariffs, and conditions 
on financial liberalization should lead to increase financial deregulation. 
Hypothesis 5:  Political leaders may be more likely to implement reforms after a debt, 
inflationary, or recessionary crisis, when other options are limited or less appealing.  
 
Causal Complexity, Interaction, and Some Broader Hypotheses.  
 While ideology, capability, and opportunity are discussed separately above, the 
relationship between these concepts is more complex. It is likely that when an ideological 
motivation is present than only one of opportunity or capability is necessary in order to 
implement neoliberal market reforms. Chile, is perhaps, the best example of this where 
neoliberal market reforms were implemented by the military dictatorship even after the 
opportunity, a hyperinflation crisis and recession, was passed. This is due to the military 
dictatorship, led by General Augusto Pinochet, was ideologically supportive of neoliberal 
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reforms and had complete control of the government with no opposition party to provide a 
possible veto power. In the case of Chile, the combination of ideological motivation combined 
with the capability to implement reforms through dictatorial powers was sufficient to enact 
extensive neoliberal market reforms.  
Hypothesis A: Ideological motivation for reform combined with the opportunity and/or 
capability to adopt reforms is sufficient to implement neoliberal market reforms.  
 On the other hand, countries where the political leadership lacks the ideological 
motivation will likely only implement reforms when opportunity and capability are present. If 
crises and IMF conditionality are present along with a relatively cohesive government, political 
leaders may feel that their best policy option is to move forward with the reforms outlined by the 
IMF. For example, in Brazil, a leftist government under the first Fernando Henrique Cardoso and 
then Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva implemented neoliberal market reforms when faced with strong 
IMF pressure – over 40 conditions from 2001 to 2004. Both President Cardoso and President 
Lula da Silva ran on more left-leaning platforms, but when faced with IMF pressure and threats 
of a debt crisis (external debt was around 45-50 percent of GDP), both men implemented some 
form of neoliberal market reforms.  
Hypothesis B: Capability to implement reforms combined with an opportunity to enact reforms 
will be sufficient to implement neoliberal market reforms.  
 Given these examples as well as the literature discussed above, I contend that in many 
cases the presence of two of the three factors (ideology, capability, and opportunity) are 
sufficient to implement neoliberal market reforms and that ideology and capability will be the 
more likely combination to result in reforms. I test these broader hypotheses along with the 
literature specific hypotheses using two different methods. The first method, regression analysis, 
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is used to study which variables from the literature are most likely to lead to reforms on their 
own and is used to address hypotheses 1-5. The second method, fsQCA, is used to examine the 
combination of causal conditions that lead to neoliberal reforms with an emphasis on exploring 
the different pathways to reform. This method primarily addresses hypotheses A and B. The 
following chapter (Chapter 3) will discuss case selection criteria, variable operationalization, 
data cleaning, coding, and calibration, as well as information on regression and fsQCA.  
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CHAPTER 3:  
MODELING NEOLIBERAL MARKET REFORMS AND THEIR CAUSES 
 
 This project uses two main methods of analysis to test the hypotheses discussed in 
Chapter 2. OLS regression and logistic regression is used to test Hypotheses 1-5 while fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) is used to explore Hypotheses A and B. By combining 
OLS regression and fsQCA, this project provides insight into the significance and impact of the 
independent variables on the implementation of reforms as well as how these independent 
variables combine and interact to influence the adoption of neoliberal market reforms. Countries 
that were considered “advanced countries” according to the 1991 CIA world factbook were 
excluded from this study. The countries excluded in this manner were Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, NZ, Norway, Sweden, UAE, UK, and the US (CIA 1992). While the 
it is debatable what constitutes “advanced”, “developed” or “core” countries, these countries also 
represented the most economically and politically stable countries during the time period of 
greatest interest, 1975-2000. Beyond dropping these 19 countries, several other countries were 
excluded due to large amounts of missing data on one or more of the key dependent or 
independent variables. The number of cases for each analysis varies depending on the dependent 
variable or causal outcome in question.  
This chapter is broken down into the following sections. First, I discuss the OLS and 
logistic regression methodology and the fsQCA methodology. Next, I discuss the data for my 
dependent variables on the implementation of neoliberal market reforms including financial 
deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization. Third, I elaborate on the specific 
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independent variables for Ideological Motivation, Capability, and Opportunity as well as the 
relevant control variables. Finally, I explicate the ways that OLS regression and fsQCA can 
complement each other as methods of analysis.  
 
REGRESSION METHODOLOGY 
 This project employs both OLS regression and logistic regression to evaluate the 
determinates of three types of neoliberal market reforms, financial deregulation, trade 
liberalization, and privatization. In order to better understand the role of the IMF conditionality, 
debt, and crises in the implementation of reforms, I first did an OLS regression on the 
determinants of IMF conditionality. This allows me to better model how IMF conditionality 
interacts with debt, inflation, and crises. Next, I used OLS and logistic regression to measure the 
effect of economic crises, elections, executive ideology, legislative control, and particularly IMF 
conditionality on the implementation neoliberal market reforms, particularly financial reform, 
tariff reduction, and privatization. The model is a fixed-effects logit model for the financial 
reform and privatization, which controls for endogeneity bias autocorrelation error by using a 
fixed-effects model grouped by country. While a fixed-effects panel regression models were 
used for measuring the determinates of IMF conditionality and tariff reduction.   
 The unit of analysis for the logistic regression analysis is a country-year and the number 
of cases in each logistic regression analysis varied depending on the dependent variable in 
question. Due to some missing data for each of the independent and dependent variables the final 
datasets for the full models (including all independent and control variables) for each dependent 
variable were as follows. The number of cases for each country are not equal due to missing data 
from independent and control variables. The full model for financial deregulation contained 866 
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cases covering 45 countries from 1980 to 2005. The full model for tariff reform contained 1,028 
observations covering 87 countries from 1989 to 2012. The full model for privatization reform 
contained 1,829 observations covering 75 countries from 1980 to 2012.  
The logistic regression model used to estimate these effects for financial reform and 
privatization is: 
 
Prob(reform= 1|IMF,Econ,Ideo,Elec,Leg)I = Φ(λ + αIMF + βCrises + μIdeo + γElec + σLeg + ε) 
 
Where α, β, μ, γ, and σ are the vectors of the parameters to be estimated and Φ is the logistic 
function. The error term is represented by ε. Logistic regression is used when the dependent 
variable is binary and not interval or ratio scale. In this project, logistic regression is primarily 
used to assess the effect of key independent variables, particularly IMF conditionality on 
likelihood of financial reform and privatization reform implementation. Coefficients are 
converted to odds ratios and the significance of the coefficients are assessed using alpha levels of 
.01, .05, and .1.  
 The OLS regression model used to estimate effects of external debt, inflation, and GDP 
growth on IMF conditionality is as follows: 
 
IMF conditions = A + b1(debt) + b2(GDP growth) + b3(inflation) + b4(controls) + e 
 
Where A is the constant, b1-b4 are the coefficients, and e is the error term. This model also 
includes controls for GDP per capita and year. The OLS regression model for the determinates of 
tariff reduction is as follows: 
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Tariff = A + b1(Debt) + b2(IMF) + b3(Crises) + b4(Ideo) + b5(Elec) + b6(Leg) + b7(controls) + e 
 
Where A is the constant, b1-b6 are the coefficients, and e is the error term. This model, like all 
previous models, includes controls for GDP per capita and year.  
Individual variables were assessed for outliers or skewness and several independent 
variables, described in the data section, were logged to reign in large outliers. Furthermore, 
independent variables were checked for collinearity using a correlation matrix with no two 
independent variables having a correlation above .5. A table reporting this correlation matrix can 
be found in Appendix A. GDP per capita is used as a control variable for country size and 
income, while year is used to control for the fact that reforms generally increased over time. In 
addition, three interaction terms were tested in these models to better mirror the theoretical 
conceptualization discussed in Chapter 2. First, an interaction term (debt*GDPgrowth) is used in 
all models to test for the interaction between rising external debt and a recession crisis. Second, 
there were two interaction terms used to model how ideology and capability might mitigate or 
condition each other. To do this, I interacted (Ideo*Control of All Legislative Houses) and 
(Ideo*Democracy). These interaction terms were tested for each dependent variable and IMF 
conditionality.  
 
FUZZY-SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 Developed by Ragin (2000), fsQCA is an analytic technique that uses set-theory and 
Boolean algebra to compare macro social phenomena across cases. In contrast with econometric 
based analyses, fsQCA does not focus on how much a given variable or measure contributes to 
explained variance, instead fsQCA is case focused, and is used to analyze the ways different 
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causal conditions combine to produce the specific outcome. Additionally, fsQCA allows for the 
possibility of multiple causation – situations where more than one explanatory pathway may lead 
to the same outcome. This is especially useful here in examining a combination of conditions be 
sufficient to lead to the implementation of neoliberal market reforms.  
Due to the case focused nature of fsQCA, the dataset was collapsed by country and 
political ideology of the executive to form cases encompassing multiple years and use aggregate 
data for the causal conditions and outcomes for those years. This means that the unit of analysis 
for the fsQCA portion of this project are countries covering multiple years and each of the causal 
conditions and outcomes are averaged over the number of years for each country. Furthermore, 
when enough years of data were available, a country was divided into two cases based on the 
political ideology of the executive branch. This allows for the focus of the analysis to be on the 
countries themselves and how political ideology changes the pathways to reform. Additionally, 
rather than using three different measures of neoliberal market reform, these measures were 
added together and then averaged creating an overall measure of reform.  
Collapsing the data into countries makes the focus of fsQCA on the country itself rather 
than the country year. This provided a slightly bigger picture view of the pathway each country 
took towards reform as well as how political ideology impacts this pathway. After collapsing the 
dataset, any country with less than 3 years of data was dropped in order to decrease the risks of 
outliers impacting the means for each variable. This left a total of 79 cases covering 59 countries 
with the number of country-years for each case varying between 3 and 16.  
In order to better test Hypotheses A – that a combination of ideological motivation with 
the opportunity and/or capability to adopt reforms will be sufficient to implement neoliberal 
reforms – and Hypothesis B – that a combination of capability and opportunity conditions will be 
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sufficient to enact neoliberal market reforms – two combined measures for ideological 
motivation and economic crisis were created. The combined measure for ideological motivation 
uses the highest calibrated score for debt and inflation as either type of crisis could be a cause of 
neoliberal market reforms. The same logic was used for combining the calibrated scores for both 
ideological causal conditions, right wing executive and high exports to GDP. The result are two 
new causal conditions, economic crisis and ideological motivation that better capture the 
theoretical framework this project is trying to explore and test while allowing for more focus on 
the cases and the pathways to reform reflected in the literature.  
 As a method, fsQCA is used to determine which causal conditions are necessary for an 
outcome to occur and which conditions are sufficient. Necessary conditions are causal conditions 
that must be present for the outcome to occur. Sufficient conditions, on the other hand, are causal 
conditions that when combined are enough to cause the outcome to occur. Both necessary and 
sufficient conditions are measured in terms of their “consistency” and “coverage”. Consistency is 
the degree to which cases with a given configuration of causal conditions are a subset of cases 
with the outcome. Coverage, on the other hand, indicates the proportion of cases with give 
configuration of causal conditions and the outcome. 
 The main difference between fuzzy sets and conventional variables is the 
conceptualization (Ragin 2008). Fuzzy sets are conceptualized as membership in a pre-defined 
set of cases. For example, whereas the variable ‘exports as a percentage of GNI’ can be used 
directly as a variable in a regression, for fsQCA it needs to be re-conceptualized as membership 
in the set of export-dependent countries. When operationalized, exports as a percentage of GNI 
will need to be calibrated into the set of export dependent countries based on substantive 
theoretical and case knowledge. Membership in each set is scored inclusively from 0 to 1 based 
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on degree of membership, with 0.95 the threshold for fully in, 0.05 the threshold for full out, and 
0.5 as a cross-over point. Calibration scores can range anywhere from 0 to 1 in contrast to crisp 
sets which are scored exclusively as 0 or 1. Cases can have the same membership score even if 
they have different interval scores. Calibration of causal conditions is critical to fsQCA. 
Constructing well thought out fuzzy sets requires knowledge of both the cases involved as well 
as a theoretical conceptualization about what membership in a given set looks like.  
 The fsQCA work was done using the fs/QCA 3.0 software developed by Ragin and 
Davey (2016). First, an analysis of necessary conditions was conducted with both the separate 
causal conditions and the two combined causal conditions for economic crisis and ideological 
motivation. Next, a truth table analysis was conducted to determine explanatory pathways that 
were sufficient to lead to neoliberal reform. For this analysis the frequency cutoff was two cases 
per pathway and the consistency cutoff was 0.9 for each pathway. This means that pathways with 
less than two cases were dropped from the analysis and pathways with a consistency of less than 
0.9 were coded as having an outcome of 0 while pathways with consistency of greater than 0.9 
were coded as having an outcome of 1. A standard analysis was then conducted with all causal 
conditions assumed to contribute to neoliberal reform when present.  
 This project uses fsQCA to assess how IMF conditionality is mediated by other causal 
conditions leading to financial deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization. The focus 
here is not how significant or the effect size of IMF conditionality or any other causal condition. 
Rather, the focus is on the combination of conditions that lead to the outcome and the different 
pathways countries took to similar reforms.  
 
MEASURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEOLIBERAL REFORMS 
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 This project focuses on three aspects of neoliberal market reforms as outlined in the 
Washington Consensus (Williamson 1993). These three features are financial deregulation, trade 
liberalization, and privatization. The focus on these three facets of neoliberal market reforms is 
due to data limitations as well as importance of these three facets of reform in the literature on 
neoliberalism (Agnello et al. 2015; Bortolotti and Pinotti 2003; Campos et al. 2010; Roberts and 
Saeed 2012; Teichman 1996). Furthermore, opponents of neoliberal market reforms frequently 
link inequality, poverty, and other social issues to these reforms (Barra and Dello Buono 2009; 
Chang 2009; Przeworski and Vreeland 200). These three facets are not combined to form an 
overall index of reform. This is due, in large part, to the fact that while all these policies are 
considered neoliberal market reforms and are included in the Washington Consensus, they do not 
represent the entire spectrum of neoliberal reform. Furthermore, a factor analysis showed little 
correlation between the three main dependent variables. Table 3.1 below provides the basic 
descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. 
 
TABLE 3.1: DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  
Frequency Percent  
N Yes  No  Yes No 
Financial Reform 1,576 456 1,120 28.93 71.07 
Privatization 5,900 959 4,941 16.25 83.75 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Tariff Reform 2,239 8.38 11.87 0 421.5 
 
Financial Deregulation 
 To measure the extent of financial deregulation, this project uses A New Database of 
Financial Reforms (Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel 2008). The dataset covers 91 countries over 
the period 1973 – 2005 and includes an index covering seven different dimensions of financial 
policy. These seven dimensions are (1) credit controls, (2) interest rate controls, (3) entry barriers 
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for new banks, (4) state ownership in the banking sector, (5) Capital account restrictions and 
international financial transactions, (6) regulations and supervision of the banking sector, and (7) 
regulation and restrictions on the securities market (Abiad et al. 2008:4-6). Each country is 
scored from zero to three on these seven dimensions, with zero signifying the highest degree of 
state control and three being full liberalization. To create a comprehensive measure of financial 
reform, these seven dimensions are aggregated together to form an index of financial reform with 
values between 0 and 21 (Abiad et al. 2008:9).  
 Abiad et al. (2008) also created a dichotomous variable of this index to capture when 
reform occurred. This is significant because financial deregulation generally increased from year 
to year from 1973-2005. Therefore, having a measure that focuses on more substantial changes 
can help control for this general increase over time. An increase of 1 or more points on the index 
is classified as a reform (Abiad et al. 2008: 9). This project uses this reform variable as its 
measure of financial deregulation.  
  
Trade Liberalization 
 Trade liberalization involves the removal or reduction of barriers to the import of foreign 
goods. While trade barriers can include things like quotas, licenses, slow processing, and other 
non-monetary barriers, the focus of the Washington Consensus is on tariff reduction. The 
Washington Consensus advocates for completely removing any quantitative or quota restrictions 
as well as reducing tariffs to 10 percent (Williamson 1993: 1333). Subsequently, this project 
focuses on tariffs as the measure for trade liberalization with lower tariffs signifying more trade 
liberalization. Data for tariffs comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2017). This tariff data is a weighted mean of tariffs applied to all products coming 
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into a given country. The weighted mean is used in order to control for the variations in the 
quantity and value of different products coming in and provide a more accurate account of trade 
controls. This tariff data covers the years 1988 to 2013 and includes 186 countries.  
A dichotomous variable is used to signify a large decrease in tariffs for the fsQCA 
methodology. This dichotomous variable for a decrease in tariffs is coded 1 for when there is a 
decrease in the weighted mean tariff rate by 1 percentage point or more. While tariff rates are not 
a perfect measure of overall trade liberalization, they are the indicator for trade liberalization 
with the best data available and the most well-known indicator.  
 
Privatization  
 Data for privatization comes from the World Bank’s Privatization Database (World 
Bank, 2017). However, this data is not very uniform and is inconsistent in its reporting of the 
value of the privatizations. This is exacerbated by the fact that the privatization process in many 
countries was corrupt or enacted under duress, leading to inaccurate records and prices (Shamis 
2002). Subsequently, rather than track the value of sales, a dichotomous variable is used. This 
variable is coded 1 if any privatization occurred for that country-year and 0 if no privatization 
occurred.  
While, this process means that some variation is lost for cases involving multiple 
privatization within the same country-year, the quality and potential incompleteness of the data 
makes the sale values for these countries dubious at best. Moreover, there is some likelihood that 
this data is partially incomplete. As with all data from the World Bank and other international 
financial institutions, the data quality is reliant on reports from member countries. With 
privatization, there may have been some incentive not to report or inaccurately report the sale of 
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state assets in order to cover up corruption and rent-seeking behaviors (Schamis 2002). However, 
this is the best data presently available and the dichotomous coding is as precise a measure as the 
current privatization data allows for. Hopefully, in the future, better data sources will become 
available that is more accurate in terms of data coverage and data completeness. 
 
Measuring Causal Outcomes for fsQCA 
 For fsQCA, the causal outcome is a combination of all three of the above reforms. To 
create this combined causal outcome, the dichotomous variables were added together to form a 
scale from 0-3. This scale was then averaged when the country-year data was collapsed into a 
country unit of analysis. This average was then calibrated to create membership scores in the set 
of consistent neoliberal reforms with 1.5 as fully in threshold (examples include Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Tunisia), 1 as the cross-over point (Bangladesh is in at .62 and Algeria is out at .4) , and 0 as 
fully out (Nepal, Costa Rica, Cameroon). This means if a country averages more than one reform 
a year they are considered to be in the set of countries that have implemented consistent 
neoliberal reforms.  
 
IDEOLOGY, OPPORTUNITY, AND CAPABILITY 
 The independent variables and causal conditions used in this study are described here 
according to the theoretical category under which they are categorized; Ideological Motivation, 
Opportunity for Reform, and Capability to enact Reform. Descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables are available in Table 3.2. To calibrate the causal conditions for fsQCA, 
the causal conditions were first averaged over the number of years for each case and then 
calibrated from 0-1.  Calibration information for fsQCA is available in Table 3.3.  
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Ideological Factor 
 There is only one variable that falls under the category of ideological motivation; 
executive ideology. The variable executive ideology is operationalized as a dichotomous variable 
where 1 is a right-wing ideology and 0 is center or leftwing ideology comes from the Database 
for Political Institutions (DPI) and covers 142 countries from 1975 to 2015 (Cruz, Keefer, and 
Scartascini 2018). This dichotomous variable for right-wing ideology was used in fsQCA 
without further calibration.   
  
Opportunity Factors 
 Factors that provide politicians and government the opportunity to push for neoliberal 
market reforms are quite varied. The main variables that this project focuses on are IMF 
conditionality, external debt, inflation, recessions, and a recent election. Of these, IMF 
conditionality is particularly important for answering the questions put forward in this 
dissertation. 
 
IMF pressure. IMF conditionality is conceptualized as the amount of pressure a given 
country is under from the IMF to implement neoliberal market reforms. In turn, IMF 
conditionality is operationalized as the number of conditions a given country is under for any 
given year. This operationalization was chosen over measures involve monetary values such as 
the dispersal of funds because it is immune to irregularities in fund dispersal, fluctuations in 
country size, GDP, etc., and accounts for countries withdrawing from agreements or deciding not 
to take available IMF funds. Data for IMF conditionality comes from the IMF Monitor’s IMF 
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Conditionality Dataset (Kentikelenis, Stubs, and King 2016). A simple count of the number of 
conditions or a “Burden of Adjustment Indicator” is used. This variable is slightly skewed, with 
some countries receiving upwards of 140 conditions in a given year while others received only 
one or two conditions, so a logged version of this variable was used in the regression.  
To calibrate the number of IMF conditions for membership in the set of IMF pressure 20 
was used as the marker for fully in, 1 was used as the cross-over point, and 0 was used for fully 
out. The logic behind this is that any conditional lending from the IMF should be considered as 
IMF pressure for reform, however, being fully in the set of IMF pressure requires a higher bar. 
However, once the number of conditions gets above twenty that country is under relatively harsh 
IMF conditionality and IMF pressure.  
 
Economic crises. Economic crises can also provide opportunities for politicians to 
implement neoliberal market reforms. This project uses three different indicators for economic 
crises; inflation, external debt, and recessions. Inflation is operationalized as consumer price 
inflation. External debt is operationalized as external debt as a percentage of GNI. External debt 
is used here over other measures of debt, because it cannot be repaid simply by printing more 
money and is usually indicative of balance of trade issues and other larger economic issues.  
Recession is conceptualized as negative GDP percent growth. Recession is dichotomously coded 
as 1 when GDP growth is less than zero percent and coded 0 when GDP growth is greater than or 
equal to zero.  All three indicators come from the World Bank’s WDI. In addition, the indicators 
for external debt and recession were lagged by one year as the effects of these problems are felt 
later rather than in the moment. Inflation was not lagged since inflation is felt much more 
immediately by consumers and would result in more immediate pressure or opportunity for 
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politicians. Inflation was also quite skewed with a number of very extreme outliers and was 
therefore logged.  
For fsQCA, inflation was calibrated into the set of high inflation. Full membership (.95) 
in the set of high inflation was 100 percent, meaning that prices for consumer items doubled over 
the year, the cross-over point (.5) was set at 20 percent roughly ten times the recommended 
inflation level (Venezuela at .51 was in and Lithuania at .46 was out), and fully out point (.05) 
was set at 2 percent, which is what many countries view as a healthy inflation level. External 
debt was calibrated with the fully in threshold at 100 percent, cross-over point at 60 percent (The 
Philippines at .52 was in and Paraguay at .49 was out), and the fully out at 40 percent based on 
economists’ recommendations of healthy debt levels. These two conditions were then combined 
using the ‘fuzzy or’ function, taking the highest calibrated value between the two causal 
conditions to create a new causal condition for membership in the set of economic crises. This 
more closely models the theory that economic crises (either inflation or debt) will increase the 
chance of reform.  
GDP growth was calibrated for the set of negative growth, hereafter referred to as 
recession. Membership in the set of recession was calibrated with a fully in point at -5 percent, 
the cross-over point at 0 percent, and the fully out threshold at 2 percent growth. However, after 
the regression results and fsQCA results were analyzed, the decision was made to drop recession 
as a causal condition. The decision to drop this causal condition was based on the two main 
factors. First GDP growth has a negative impact on reforms in all the regression results and was 
only significant in the privatization models. Second, recession, the calibrated version of GDP 
growth, did not have high consistency in the fsQCA results and did not appear in any of the 
explanatory pathways to reform.  
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The final variable and causal condition in the opportunity category is recent elections. 
Elections are conceptualized as whether there was a recent legislative or executive election in the 
previous year. Elections is a lagged dichotomous variable operationalized using data on 
legislative and executive elections from DPI (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2018). For fsQCA 
the election variable was averaged over the number of years in each case. This means that the 
dichotomous election variable became a measure of election frequency. Therefore, the 
calibration for membership in the set of frequent elections used .5 as fully in (election every two 
years on average), .25 as the cross-over point (India at .5 was in and South Africa at .42 was out), 
and 0 as the fully out value.  
 
Capability Factors 
 The capability of a government to implement their chosen reforms is measured by two 
main factors; level of democracy and control of the legislature. Level of democracy is how 
democratic or authoritarian a country’s government is. It is operationalized using the polity2 
variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017). This dataset covers 149 
countries from 1975-2014 with a total of 5,270 cases. The polity2 variable measures the level of 
democracy from -10 (Autocratic) to 10 (Democratic). For fsQCA, this scale was calibrated for 
membership in the set of autocratic countries with -3, cross-over point is 3 (Kenya at .5 was in 
and Malaysia at .46 was out), and fully out is 6. This calibration sets a high bar for what is 
considered a non-authoritarian country in order to capture potential variations in coding as well 
as countries that were transitioning from full authoritarianism to partial democracy.  
 Legislative control is measured by a dichotomous indicator for whether the executive’s 
party controls all houses of the legislature. This data comes from DPI dataset (Cruz, Keefer, and 
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Scartascini 2018). Like all the other causal conditions discussed, with the exception of right-
wing executive, control of the legislature is averaged over the number of years for each case. 
Subsequently, the result is a causal condition that measures how frequently the executive had 
control of the legislature from 0-1. This is causal condition was then used in fsQCA without 
further calibration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOWARDS A COHESIVE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 The two main questions for this project are 1) How impactful is conditional lending in 
getting countries to implement neoliberal market reforms? and 2) What are the different 
pathways to neoliberal market reform? Each question lends itself to a particular method of 
TABLE 3.2: INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IMF Conditions 5064 11.26 19.53 0 148 
External Debt % Of GNI 3771 66.11 84.07 0 1380.13 
CPI Inflation % 4514 37.09 447.67 -18.11 23773.13 
Level of Democracy 5270 0.11 6.98 -10 10 
 
N Frequency Percentage 
  
Yes No Yes No 
Right-Wing Executive 5108 1895 3213 37.1 62.9 
Elections 5734 1268 4466 22.11 77.89 
Control of All houses of Leg. (Leg. 
Cont.)  
4433 2963 1470 66.84 33.16 
GDP % Growth 4981 849 4132 17.04 82.96 
TABLE 3.3: SET CALIBRATION FOR FSQCA 
  
Thresholds for Set Membership 
Variable Set Label Fully-In Cross-
over point 
Fully-Out 
IMF Conditions IMF Pressure 20 1 0 
External Debt High External Debt 100 60 40 
CPI Inflation High Inflation 100 20 3 
GDP Growth (drop) Recession -5 0 2 
Level of Democracy Authoritarian Government -3 3 6 
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analysis. Investigating the impact of conditional lending on the likelihood of neoliberal market 
reforms certainly lends itself to a variable oriented regression. The second question can also be 
explored by a regression analysis, however, to fully understand how different combinations of 
conditions from ideology, capability, and opportunity combine to lead to reforms, fsQCA is the 
best tool. By using both regression and fsQCA, this project uses a variable oriented approach and 
a case-oriented approach. In addition, fsQCA is better suited to examining the causal complexity 
of reform, while regression is better suited to looking at the net effects of individual variables on 
reform likelihood (Ragin 2008). 
 Indeed, Ragin (1987) notes that combining the broader scope of variable oriented 
research with the more granular case-based methods can be mutually supportive and beneficial to 
the overall study. The strength of the variable oriented approach is its ability to study a large 
number of cases and generalize about these cases; however, it can lack the detail and causal 
complexity that case based comparative strategies provide. In contrast case studies are often 
criticized for their lack of generalizability and limited number of cases. In combining these two 
strategies, regression and fsQCA, this project aims to combine the strength of these two 
approaches while minimizing the weaknesses. In doing so this study walks a fine line between 
parsimony and complexity, generalizability and particularism, and analysis of parts and the 
whole. The results from the methods discussed here are presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
LOGISTIC AND OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
This chapter reports the results of the logistic and OLS regression analyses. The 
regression results examine the effect of specific independent variables on the implementation 
financial deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization. Special attention is paid to the 
impact of the IMF conditionality and how this variable changes with the inclusion of other 
independent variables. The regression results are presented first, along with a review of the 
hypotheses from Chapter 3. Next, these logistic regression results are discussed in the context of 
the literature and theories discussed in previous chapters.  
 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
The results for the regression are displayed below in Tables 4.1-4.4. Table 4.1 shows the 
result for the regression on IMF conditionality, Table 4.2 provides the results for the logistic 
regression results for financial reform, Table 4.3 displays the OLS regression results for tariff 
reduction, and Table 4.4 shows the results for the logistic regression for privatization. These 
hypotheses are listed below for reference.  
• Hypothesis 1 states that countries with leaders that share ideological values with 
neoliberal market reforms, specifically right of center politicians, will be more likely to 
implement neoliberal market reforms. 
• Hypothesis 2 claims that executives with more control over the legislative branches, 
through autocratic government or more unified government, will be more capable of 
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following through with IMF conditionality and implement more extensive neoliberal 
market reforms. 
• Hypothesis 3 says that politicians will be more likely to adopt neoliberal market reforms 
shortly after an election. 
• Hypothesis 4 posits that politicians will be more likely to adopt reforms when there is 
increased pressure from the IMF in the form of IMF conditionality. 
• Hypothesis 5 contends that political leaders may be more likely to implement reforms 
after a debt, inflationary, or recessionary crisis, when other options are limited or less 
appealing. 
 
Regression Results for IMF Conditionality 
 Table 4.1 shows the regression results for IMF conditionality. Model 1 shows the results 
of external debt, GDP growth, and inflation regressed on the number of IMF conditions. Model 2 
shows the results with the added interaction term for external debt and GDP growth. Results 
from both models show external debt with a strong, positive association with the number of IMF 
conditions. This association remains strong even when the interaction term is included. Both 
inflation and GDP growth showed negative associations with the number of IMF conditions with 
inflation being significant at the .01 level in both models and GDP growth only significant at the 
.1 level in Model 2. The interaction term was positive and significant at the .1 level, but the 
effect size was quite small indicating that external debt is the primary driver of IMF 
conditionality in these models.  
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TABLE 4.1: DETERMINATES FOR THE NUMBER OF IMF CONDITIONS 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
External Debt 4.53*** 4.27***  
(0.69) (0.70) 
GDP Growth -0.012 -0.33*  
(0.078) (.18) 
External Debt * GDP Growth 
 
0.093*   
(0.047) 
Inflation -3.18*** -3.21***  
(0.96) (.96) 
GDP Per Capita -21.28*** -21.22***  
(1.78) (1.78) 
Year 0.36*** 0.36***  
(0.05) (0.05) 
Constant -559.90 -555.08  
(98.45) (98.44) 
Observations 2874 2874 
R-Square Within 0.12 0.12 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1. Each model 
includes country fixed effects. External Debt, Inflation, and GDP Per Capita are logged.  
 
 
Regression Results for Financial Deregulation 
 Table 4.2 shows the results for Models 1-8 with financial deregulation as the dependent 
variable. Coefficients are in odds ratios. Model 1 shows the results of the economic crisis 
independent variables - external debt, GDP growth, and inflation – regressed on financial 
reforms. Model 2 adds an interaction term between external debt and GDP growth, while Model 
3 adds IMF conditionality. Model 4 drops IMF conditionality, but adds the local political and 
institutional variables – right-wing executive, control of all legislative houses, and democracy. 
Models 5 and 6 add interaction terms between right-wing executive and control of all legislative 
houses or democracy respectively. Model 7 adds both political and institutional interaction terms 
together in the same model. Model 8, the final model, drops both political and institutional 
interaction terms due to a lack of significance and adds in elections and IMF conditionality.  
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 The results shown in Table 4.2 do not show support for the Hypothesis 1 that right-wing 
executives will be more likely to implement neoliberal market reforms, Hypothesis 2 that control 
of the legislative branches or an autocratic government will be more likely to implement 
neoliberal market reforms, or Hypothesis 3 which states that politicians will be more likely to 
adopt neoliberal market reforms after or during an election. However, external debt, IMF 
conditionality, and the interaction term for external debt and GDP growth were all positive and 
significant at the .01 level providing support for Hypothesis 4 that politicians will be more likely 
to adopt reforms when there is pressure from the IMF as well as Hypothesis 5 that politicians 
will be more likely to adopt reforms when faced with a debt crisis. The pseudo R-squared is 
pretty small however – 0.032 in the full model – indicating the possibility of specification error. 
 
Regression Results for Trade Liberalization 
Table 4.3 displays Models 1-7 for the OLS regression results on tariff reduction. Model 1 
shows the economic crises variables regressed on tariff rates. Model 2 includes the interaction 
term for GDP growth and external debt and Model 3 adds IMF conditionality. Model 4 brings in 
the political and institutional variables while Models 5 and 6 bring in the interaction terms of 
right-wing executive and legislative control, or democracy respectively. Finally, Model 7, the 
final model, includes both interaction terms and adds elections and IMF conditionality again.  
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TABLE 4.3: DETERMINATES OF TARIFF REDUCTION 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
External Debt -0.43 -0.39 -0.37 -0.38 -0.33 -0.35 -.31  
(0.32) (0.38) (0.38)  (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
GDP Growth -0.062 -0.20 -0.022 -0.061 -0.068* -0.065 -0.07*  
(0.04) (0.19) (0.19) (0.040) (0.04) (0.40) (0.40) 
External 
Debt*GDP 
Growth 
 
-0.01 -0.01 
    
  
(0.05) (0.05) 
    
Inflation -0.81 -0.81 -0.82 -0.71 -0.67 -.75 -.72  
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
IMF 
Conditionality 
  
-0.039 
   
-0.02 
   
(0.095) 
   
(0.094) 
Right-Wing 
   
-0.12 0.85 -1.97*** -0.58     
(0.46) (0.53) (0.76) (0.90) 
 Leg. Cont. 
   
0.88** 2.39*** 0.91 2.12***     
(0.47) (0.62) (0.47) (0.63) 
Right-Wing 
*Leg. Cont.              
    
-3.02*** 
 
-2.44*** 
     
(0.81) 
 
(0.87) 
Democracy 
   
-0.10 -0.094 -0.24*** -0.19**     
(0.08) (0.079) (0.091) (0.093) 
Right-Wing 
*Democracy 
     
0.30*** 0.20* 
      
(0.098) -0.1 
Election 
      
0.37        
(0.31) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
-7.84*** -7.86*** -7.95*** -8.18*** -8.58*** -7.99*** -8.42*** 
 
(1.23) (1.24) (1.26) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (1.26) 
Year -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.38*** -0.36***  
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.05) 
Constant 891.66 890.82 890.67 823.16 779.71 829.48 792.18  
(87.88) (88.00) (88.04) (92.23) (92.35) (91.83) (92.48) 
Observations 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028 
R-Squared 
Within 
0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 
R-Squared 
Between  
0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1. Coefficients are not standardized. Each 
model includes country fixed effects. External debt, inflation, IMF conditionality, and GDP per capita are 
logged. 
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None of the economic crisis variables were significant nor was IMF conditionality 
rejecting both Hypothesis 5 and 4 respectively. Election was also not significant showing no 
support for Hypothesis 3. However, a number of the political and institutional variables were 
significant, especially the interaction term for right-wing executive and legislative control which 
was negative and significant at the .01 level. Right-wing executive by itself was negative but not 
significant in the full model. Legislative control had a large positive impact on tariff rates and 
significant at the .01 level.  However, the interaction term had a very strong negative effect on 
tariff rates indicating support for Hypothesis 2 and partial support for Hypothesis 1. Democracy 
and the interaction term for democracy and right-wing executive were also significant in the full 
model at .05 and .1 respectively. Democracy had a small negative impact on tariff rates while the 
interaction term, democracy and right-wing executive had a small positive impact. The within 
country R-squared for the full model is 0.38 while the R-square for between countries is 0.12 
indicating some specification error, although both values are relatively strong.  
 
Regression Results For Privatization 
Table 4.4 shows logistic regression Models 1-7 with privatization as the dependent 
variable. Coefficients are in odds ratios. Like the two previous tables, Model 1 includes the 
economic crisis variables and Model 2 adds in the interaction term while Model 3 adds in the 
IMF conditionality variable. Model 4 adds the political and institutional variables while Models 
5 and 6 add in the interaction terms for Right-Wing executive with control of all legislative 
houses and democracy respectively. Finally Model 7 adds in both political and institutional 
interaction terms along with the variable for elections and IMF conditionality.  
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TABLE 4.4: DETERMINATES OF PRIVATIZATION  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  
External Debt 2.06*** 1.86*** 1.76*** 1.88*** 1.89*** 1.88*** 1.80*** 
GDP Growth 1.05*** 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94*** 0.94 0.95 
External 
Debt*GDP Growth 
 
1.03* 1.03 1.03* 1.03* 1.03* 1.03 
Inflation 1.05 1.03 1.09 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.98 
IMF Conditionality 
  
1.11*** 
   
1.11*** 
Right-Wing 
   
1.04 1.44 1.06 1.48* 
Leg. Con.  
   
1.75*** 2.39*** 1.75*** 2.40*** 
Right-Wing*Leg. 
Cont. 
    
0.50** 
 
0.48** 
Democracy 
   
1.07*** 1.06*** 1.07** 1.06*** 
Right-
Wing*Democracy 
     
1.00 
 
Election 
      
0.89 
GDP Per Capita 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 
Year 1.06*** 1.06*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 
Observations 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 
Log Likelihood -788.88 -787.43 -783.76 -778.97 -776.43 -778.97 -772.88 
Psuedo R-Squared 0.045 0.047 0.051 0.057 0.06 0.057 0.06 
Notes: ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1. Each model includes country fixed effects. Coefficients are in the form of 
odds ratios. External debt, inflation, IMF conditionality, and GDP per capita are logged. 
 
 The privatization results show that external debt is positive and significant at the .01 level 
indicating support for Hypothesis 5 that debt crises will increase the likelihood of reform. IMF 
conditionality is also positive and significant at the .01 level providing support for Hypothesis 4. 
The indicator for elections is negative but not significant therefore rejecting Hypothesis 3. 
Democracy was slightly positive and significant at .01 in the full model. This result goes against 
Hypothesis 2 which states that autocratic regimes would be capable of implementing market 
reforms. Control of all houses of the legislature was strongly positive, doubling the likelihood of 
reforms, and significant at the .01 level, suggesting some support for Hypothesis 2. Right-wing 
executives was positive, but only significant in Model 7 at the .1 level, suggesting limited 
support for Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, while both control of all legislative houses and right-
wing executives were positive in Model 7, the interaction term between the two variables was 
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strongly negative and significant at the.05 level. This suggests that on their own controlling the 
legislature and right-wing executives increase the likelihood of reform, when combined their 
impact is lessened. Furthermore, right-wing executive is only significant in the full model 
suggesting some collinearity with the interaction term. The pseudo R-square for the final model, 
Model 7 is 0.06, once again suggesting significant specification error.  
 
CAUSES OF NEOLIBERAL MARKET REFORMS 
The two main questions that began this study are 1) How impactful was conditional 
lending in getting countries to adopt neoliberal market reforms? And 2) What are the different 
pathways to neoliberal market reform? To answer these questions, I use two methodological 
approaches; regression and fsQCA. The regression analyses are used to primarily answer the first 
question while fsQCA is used to address the second question. As such, the primary focus of the 
regression analyses is to test the five hypotheses generated from the literature on the neoliberal 
market reforms, with special attention to the role of IMF conditionality. Subsequently, much of 
the discussion of the logistic regression results focuses on the impact of IMF conditionality and 
how the other independent variables impact IMF conditionality and financial reform, tariff 
reform, and privatization. 
In addition, I divided these hypotheses into three different major categories; ideological 
motivation for reform, opportunity to enact reform, and the capability to implement reform. I 
theorized that each of these three categories would be significant contributors to the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms. The results of the logistic regression analyses for 
financial reform, privatization, and tariff reform show support for the capability and opportunity 
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variables, but not the ideological variables. Below are the five hypotheses generated from the 
literature as discussed in Chapter 3.  
• Hypothesis 1 states that countries with leaders that share ideological values with 
neoliberal market reforms, specifically right of center politicians, will be more 
likely to implement neoliberal market reforms. 
• Hypothesis 2 claims that executives with more control over the legislative 
branches, through autocratic government or more unified government, will be 
more capable of following through with IMF conditionality and implement more 
extensive neoliberal market reforms. 
• Hypothesis 3 says that politicians will be more likely to adopt neoliberal market 
reforms shortly after an election. 
• Hypothesis 4 posits that politicians will be more likely to adopt reforms when 
there is increased pressure from the IMF in the form of IMF conditionality. 
• Hypothesis 5 contends that political leaders may be more likely to implement 
reforms after a debt, inflationary, or recessionary crisis, when other options are 
limited or less appealing. 
 
Causes of Financial Reform 
The results from the analysis of the determinants of financial reform showed strong 
evidence for role of IMF conditionality as a cause of financial reform. Furthermore, the results 
support the claim that economic crises, in the form of external debt, can also be a contributing 
factor to the adoption of financial reforms. However, ideological factors, such as a right-wing 
executive and large exports to GDP do not appear to contribute to the implementation of 
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financial reforms. Capability factors, in the form of autocratic governments and control of all 
legislative houses, were also not significant in the full model, Model 8)  
These results indicate support for the global political economy models that contend that 
the IMF is the dominant purveyor of financial deregulation (Peet 2009; Chang 2005) as well as 
scholars who claim that reforms are more likely when a country is undergoing an economic crisis 
(Agnello et al. 2015b; Klein 2008). Indeed, not only does being under IMF conditionality 
increase the likelihood of reform, as the number of IMF conditions increases, the likelihood of 
reform implementation increases. This means the more pressure exerted on a country by the IMF 
the more likely that country will adopt financial reforms. This result holds even when adding 
other independent variables and control variables, suggesting that IMF pressure is remains 
largely unaffected by local political and economic conditions. These results support critics of the 
IMF who argue that IMF pressure is the primary cause of neoliberal market reforms and 
encroaches on national sovereignty and the options available to politicians.  
In fact, Peet (2009), makes this very argument, claiming that IMF conditionality removes 
state sovereignty and places more power in the hands of global financial institutions, such as the 
IMF and World Bank to make policy decisions, instead of local or national governments. 
Moreover, Chang (2008) makes the case that the policies included in IMF conditionality – 
especially around financial deregulation, which opens countries to foreign investment – are not 
designed to actually “develop” or “help” these countries out of a financial situation. Instead, 
Chang (2008) contends that these policies are instead designed to reshape these countries, 
opening them up as centers for low-wage manufacturing, resource extraction, and labor. This 
makes sense when you look at the other significant variable in the full model, external debt.  
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The results show support for the idea that external debt can push countries into adopting 
neoliberal market reforms, including financial deregulations. Specifically, the results support the 
conclusion of Agnello et al. (2015a) that external debt crises were the main cause of banking and 
finance reforms. However, there are some scholars who claim that external debt will also make a 
country more likely to engage in IMF conditionality as their need for a lender of last resort 
increases (Felix 1990; Klein 2008; Stallings 1992). This means that high external debt may an 
antecedent variable for IMF conditionality rather than a direct cause of reform. Furthermore, 
Wallerstein (2000) argues that the debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s and the role of the IMF as 
lender of last resort, were part of a broader global crisis of capitalism as the world-economy 
expanded.  
To better understand the relationship between economic crises and IMF conditionality, I 
regressed the economic crisis variables on the number of IMF conditions. These results are 
shown in Table 4.1. Logged external debt showed a strong, positive association with IMF 
conditionality suggesting that external debt is a major driver of IMF conditionality. These results 
provide further evidence for the theoretical framework laid out by Wallerstein (2000) and other 
political economy and world systems scholars (Klein 2008; Peet 2009; Vreeland 2007).  
Equally interesting is the fact that ideological variables and capability variables were not 
significant determinates of financial reform. In contrast to work by Roberts and Saeed (2012), 
there was no link between the ideology of the executive and the implementation of financial 
reforms. Furthermore, there was no evidence to suggest that autocratic governments or 
governments that controlled all houses of the legislature were significantly more likely enact 
financial deregulation. These results run counter to scholars who argue for the role of local 
politics and institutions in reform (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Agnello et al 2015b; Smith et al. 
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1994). This means that in the case of financial reforms, local political and institutional factors 
most likely are indeed reacting to external pressures to reform, either from the IMF or from the 
economy, rather than mediating these pressures.  
Overall, the results from Models 1-8 with financial reform as the dependent variable 
provide support Hypotheses 4 and 5 while rejecting Hypotheses 1,2, and 3. This supports the 
arguments from global political economy scholars, particularly dependency and world systems 
scholars, that the IMF is a crucial cause of neoliberal market reforms including financial 
deregulation. Specifically, the regression results support the claim that crises, in this case debt 
crises, are used by global financial institutions and TNCs to push financial deregulation on 
countries through IMF conditionality (Chang 2008; Klein 2008; Peet 2009).  In addition, claims 
by scholarly proponents of the crisis-induced reform hypothesis were partially supported with 
external debt being a significant determinant of financial reform. In contrast there was little 
evidence to support the claims from that ideology, autocracy, or control of legislature played a 
major role in contributing to the implementation of financial reforms. Finally, the results for the 
determinates of financial reform do not support my theoretical framework that local political and 
institutional factors play a major role in the adoption of financial reforms with only opportunity 
related variables – crises and IMF conditions – being significant.  
 
Causes of Trade Reform 
For trade reform, measured in terms of weighted tariff means for all products, very few of 
the independent variables involved were significant. IMF conditionality does not seem to be a 
significant contributing factor to the implementation of tariff reforms with the number of IMF 
conditions not being significant in any of the models. Furthermore, no economic crisis variables 
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were significant in any of the models except GDP growth which had a small negative effect on 
tariff rates in the full model. The fact that higher GDP growth would lead to lower tariffs also 
runs counter to the idea that crises provide opportunities for the implementation of tariff reform 
(Klein 2008). This mostly likely means that as countries stabilize and start growing, they lower 
tariffs so that they can better compete in the world market. Given the negative correlation 
between GDP per capita and tariff reductions, it seems likely that tariff rates are more a function 
of a countries wealth and position in the world-economy rather than direct IMF pressure.  
Wealthier countries may be more resistant to changes in tariffs from external forces and 
more capable of protecting local or national industries. World system scholars argue that tariff 
reductions are typically pushed on peripheral and semi-peripheral countries by wealthier core 
and semi-peripheral countries in order to better exploit cheap resources and labor in the poorer 
countries (Chang 2005; Wallerstein 2004). Subsequently, wealthier (semi-peripheral) countries 
may push for lower trade barriers, while not lowering their own. Furthermore, countries may be 
forced to lower trade barriers in order to be better equipped to compete in global supply chains.  
While the economic crisis and IMF conditionality variables do not seem to play a major 
role in tariff rates, local political and institutional factors seem to take on a larger role. Right-
wing executive was significant in Model 6, but this is most likely due to the interaction term. 
Control of all legislative houses was significant in most of the models but served to increase 
tariffs rather than decrease them. However, when we look at the interaction term for right-wing 
executives and control of all legislative houses  the result is very negative and significant 
suggesting that the combination of ideology (right-wing executive) along with  the capability to 
pass reform (control of all legislative houses) serves to decrease tariff rates supporting 
Hypothesis 2.  Indeed, much of the literature on role of political and institution factors in the 
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implementation reform suggest that a unified government will be able to implement more 
reforms than a fragmented or divided government (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 
1999). 
Interestingly, once again, democracy seems to increase reform. In this case democratic 
regimes reduced tariffs slightly, although when combined with a right-wing executive the 
interaction term is positive. This likely means that on their own democracies and right-wing 
executives both reduce tariffs. However, when democracies are combined with a right-wing 
executive, the democratic nature of the government mitigates the effect of the right-wing 
executive. Indeed, in Model 5, when the interaction term for right-wing executive and control of 
all legislative houses is added, the coefficient for democracy is substantially lower than in Model 
6 or 7, indicating that the effect of democracy on tariff reduction is mitigated when the right-
wing executive controls all legislative houses. These results support the contention by political 
scientists that democratic regimes are more likely to implement reforms and absorb the costs of 
these reforms than fragile democracies or autocracies (Campos, Hsiao, and Nugent 2010; Joyce 
2006). Overall, the tariff reform results shown in Table 4.3 provide much more support for the 
ideological and capability factors than did financial reform results. 
 
Causes of Privatization 
 The models for privatization reforms included many significant independent variables. 
IMF conditionality, level of democracy, control of all legislative houses, external debt, and 
recession were all positive and significant in the full model at the .01 level. Right-wing executive 
was only significant in the final model, Model 7, and even then, only at the .1 level, most likely 
due to collinearity with the interaction terms. The interaction term for right-wing executive and 
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control of all legislative houses was negative and significant at the .05 level, while the 
democracy and right-wing executive interaction term was not significant.  
 Privatization is a major part of neoliberal ideology and of IMF conditionality, so it makes 
sense that the IMF would push for states to privatize their SOEs. The global political economy 
literature argues that the push to privatize from the IMF and other IFIs was a way to pressure 
countries into selling their companies to foreign companies or TNCs (Peet 2009). On the other 
hand, proponents of neoliberal reform contend that the IMF was simply pushing countries to 
reform corrupt and inefficient industries (Chong and López-de-Silanes 2005). However, the 
actual implementation of privatization was often marred by corruption and rent-seeking behavior 
(Schamis 2002). The regression results for privatization suggest that IMF conditionality was a 
major cause of privatization.  
 Right-wing executive was only significant in the final model and only barely significant. 
It therefore seems unlikely that ideology, at least as this project has measured it, plays much of a 
causal role in privatization. This means that executives are constrained in what they feel they can 
do by IMF conditionality, economic crises, and the legislature. Weyland (2002) makes a similar 
argument suggesting that while political leaders do possess ideological pre-dispositions, their 
primary concern is re-election and remaining popular. These constraints make it difficult to 
pursue unpopular policies without an external push, either from the IMF or from crises (Vreeland 
2007; Agnello et al 2015b). These assumptions are further supported by results for the capability 
and opportunity variables; control of all legislative houses and external debt.  
 Both the level of democracy and control of all legislative houses were positive and 
significant the full model. The results show that more democratic countries are more likely to 
enact reforms, although this association is rather weak in the full model. This supports arguments 
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by Kaufman and Stallings (1989) as well as Campos, Hsiao, and Nugent (2010) that 
democracies, particularly established democracies are more likely to impose the costs of reforms, 
such as privatization, than non-democracies or weaker democracies. This was a surprising 
finding for me. I hypothesized, based on my experience in Latin American reform efforts, that 
authoritarian governments would be more willing and able to impose the costs of privatization. 
However, on further reading and consideration, many authoritarian governments may not have 
the inclination to reform and may be more unwilling to relinquish control of certain lucrative 
businesses. In addition, because of how democracy is measured, there are far more “weak 
democracies” – measured through the polity2 variable from 1-4 – than there are autocracies – 
polity2 score of less than 0. This may have resulted in the relatively strong democracies – above 
4 – implementing reforms, while the relatively weaker democracies did not. Future research 
should consider creating dummy variables for autocracies, weak democracies, and strong 
democracies. I suspect that, weak democracies will be correlated with weaker governments and 
institutions, and therefore less likely to reform.  
 The results for control of all legislative houses was less surprising. Unless a government 
can overcome opposition through autocracy, decree, or negotiation, controlling the legislative 
branch is important to passing privatizations, more so than the other types of reform in this study. 
This may be due to the more public and controversial nature of privatization. Privatization of 
SOEs in many countries meant the loss of well-paid state employment and potential foreign 
ownership, all of which could be politically problematic. The fact that privatization, has a more 
direct and visible impact on people, makes it a potential political hazard (Bortolotti and Pinotti 
2003; Kohl 2002; Schamis 2002). The inclusion of the capability variables only lowers the 
coefficient of IMF conditions a little, suggesting that IMF pressure still plays a large role in 
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pushing governments to privatize. Furthermore, it is likely that legislatures are making the same 
or similar risk assessment decisions as executives. Consequently, many legislatives, when faced 
with economic crises and IMF pressure, may decide that embracing reform, reluctantly or 
otherwise, is there best or only recourse. Interestingly, the interaction term between right-wing 
executive and control of all legislative houses was negative. This implies that when a right-wing 
executive controls all of the houses of the legislature, the implementation of reforms slows. 
However, the effect of right-wing executive and control of all legislative houses are so strong, 
the effect may be minimal. Nevertheless, this interaction term warrants consideration in future 
research.  
 Of the variables for opportunity, external debt and recession were significant while 
inflation and elections were not. Recession had a strong negative association with privatization 
while external debt had a strong positive association. Countries may be unlikely to undergo 
privatization when the economy is in a recession because the price of those companies will be 
much lower. However, the strong correlation between debt and privatization suggests that 
countries undergoing a debt crisis may be more likely to sell their SOEs, potentially to raise 
funds to pay off said debt. These results support the conclusions of Li and Xu (2002) as well as 
Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) that debt is a predictor of privatization.  
Again, based on results for the regression on IMF conditions in Table 4.1, I theorize that 
because the IMF is a lender of last resort for countries that external debt is an antecedent variable 
for both IMF conditionality and privatization. The significance of external debt does lend 
credence to the theory that politicians, when face with a crisis, can take the crisis as an 
opportunity to push for desired privatization. On the flip side, politicians that are not predisposed 
to favor privatization may view privatization, amid a debt crisis, to the best option available. 
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These theories are echoed in Weyland’s (2002) prospect theory, which argues that politicians are 
risk adverse and will be wary of acting on reform unless faced with an opportunity or when the 
cost of not acting becomes too high.  
 Overall, the models for privatization show support for Hypotheses 4 and 5 which suggest 
that politicians will be more likely to adopt reforms when under pressure from the IMF or when 
faced with an economic crisis. In addition, the privatization models partials support Hypothesis 3 
that executives who have control of the legislature will be more likely to implement reforms. 
IMF conditionality, external debt, democracy, and control of all legislative houses are all 
positively associated with privatization, while GDP growth is weakly and negatively correlated 
with privatization. Furthermore, these results are the first to show some support for the 
theoretical conceptualization discussed in Chapter 2, particularly Hypothesis B, which argues 
that a combination of the capability to enact reforms through control of the legislature along with 
pressure or opportunity to reform from economic crises or the IMF will lead to reform. This 
hypothesis cannot be fully answered by regression and will be explored further in the fsQCA 
discussion.  
 
Implications of the Logistic Regression Results 
 The logistic regression results show that different neoliberal market reforms share certain 
characteristics with each other but are also quite distinct from each other. While privatization, 
tariff, and financial reforms share some common similarities in the causal models, they also 
differ in several significant ways, particularly tariff reforms. IMF conditionality was significant 
in all three types of reform, albeit less so for tariff reform. In addition, some form of opportunity 
variable was significant for privatization and financial reform, but not tariff reform. The same is 
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true for external debt which was significant in both financial reform and privatization. Results 
from the capability variables were more mixed, with level of democracy and control of all houses 
significant in the privatization and tariff reform models. Finally, none of the ideological variables 
were very significant in any of the models, except tariff reform, suggesting that ideology does 
not play as large role in the implementation of neoliberal market reforms as hypothesized.   
 The results from the regression strongly support the global political economy approach to 
understanding the implementation of neoliberal market reforms, particularly for financial reform 
and privatization. IMF conditionality was positive and significant to some degree for financial 
reform and privatization. IMF conditionality is seen by global political economy scholars as a 
major cause of neoliberal market reforms, particularly in Latin America and Africa (Emeagwali 
2011; Kentikelenis 2015; Barra 2009). The global political economy literature, particularly the 
world systems and dependency literatures are very critical of these neoliberal reforms and the 
IMF’s role in pushing these reforms (Peet 2009; Chang 2009; Oberdabernig 2013). The results of 
the logistic regression, particularly the financial reform and privatization models, support the 
hypothesis that IMF conditionality is a cause of neoliberal market reforms.  
 A major part of the arguments by global political economy scholars is that the crises, 
especially economic crises, play a major role in the implementation of neoliberal reforms. The 
logistic regression results show that external debt was positive and significant for financial 
reform and privatization. Global political economy contends that global economic crises during 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s pushed many countries to participate in IMF conditionality and 
therefore implement neoliberal reforms (Harvey 2005; Stallings 1992; Felix 1990). Indeed, 
several studies have shown a link between debt, and privatization and financial reforms (Agnello 
et al 2015a; Abiad and Mody 2005; Borolotti and Pinotti 2003). It seems likely, based on the 
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overall regression results, that IMF conditionality and economic crises, especially external debt, 
play a major role in the implementation of neoliberal market reforms.  
 The capability variables, level of democracy and control of all houses of the legislature, 
were only significant in the results for privatization and tariff reform. Furthermore, the right-
wing executive variable was not consistently significant in any of the models. The lack of 
significance of this variable for ideological motivation for most of the regression models 
suggests that criticisms of IMF conditional lending as a way of removing national sovereignty 
might have some merit. World-systems and dependency scholars claim that the IMF along with 
other IFIs serve to help preserve the structural inequality inherent in the global capitalist system 
(Arrighi et al. 2003; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Wallerstein 2004). Peet (2009) makes this 
even more explicit, arguing that IMF conditionality removes state sovereignty and places much 
of the policy making authority in the hands of IFIs instead of local politicians. 
 Taken together, the regression results do not support the theoretical framework laid out in 
this project. While a few opportunity variables were significant, in the form of economic crises 
and IMF conditionality, there was very little support for capability variables, and no support for 
ideological variables. Given these results, it seems likely that the global political economy 
literature provides a more accurate explanation for the implementation of neoliberal economic 
reforms than the theoretical framework put forth in this project. The variables that were most 
consistently significant in the models were the global or international variables linked to the IMF 
and other world-wide economic inequalities rather than the more domestic or national variables 
put forward by political scientists and economists. The next section uses the fsQCA results to 
further discuss the implementation of neoliberal market reforms.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
FUZZY-SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
 This chapter reports and discusses the results for the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA). The fsQCA results look for pathways of causal conditions that are necessary 
or sufficient for reform with special attention paid to causal complexity. The fsQCA results are 
presented with the relevant hypotheses from Chapter 3. Next, the fsQCA results are discussed in 
the context of the literature and theoretical framework developed in this dissertation.  
 
FSQCA RESULTS 
 The results from four different fsQCA analyses are shown in the section. First, results 
from the analysis of necessary conditions are presented in Table 5.1. Table 5.1 also presents the 
abbreviations that will be used in future tables for the causal conditions and outcome. All causal 
conditions are shown including the separate and combined conditions for ideological motivation 
(right wing executive and high exports) and economic crisis (high debt and high inflation). Next, 
Table 5.2 displays the results of the initial fsQCA truth table analysis for sufficient conditions 
with separate causal conditions for right wing executive and high exports, and high debt and 
inflation. Third, truth table analyses for sufficient conditions with combined conditions for 
ideological motivation and economic crisis are presented. Table 5.3 shows the complex solution 
while Table 5.4 shows the slightly simplified intermediate solution. Tables 5.2- 5.4 also include 
the solution consistency and coverage for all the explanatory pathways combined. These fsQCA 
results are used to help explore Hypotheses A and B as well as look for patterns in the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms. Hypotheses A and B are restated below. 
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• Hypothesis A: Ideological motivation for reform combined with the opportunity and/or 
capability to adopt reforms is sufficient to implement neoliberal market reforms. 
• Hypothesis B: Capability to implement reforms combined with an opportunity to enact 
reforms will be sufficient to implement neoliberal market reforms. 
 
Analysis Necessary Conditions 
 An initial analysis of necessary conditions was conducted and is shown in Table 5.1 
below. Necessary conditions are conditions that are either necessary for the outcome to occur or 
are common underlying conditions that may or may not be causal. An analysis of necessary 
conditions can provide a small window into what conditions might be important in future 
examinations of sufficient conditions and generally gives an idea of the relative import of each 
condition. I consider a causal condition ‘necessary’ if the consistency is over .8. 
 
TABLE 5.1.: NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR NEOLIBERAL REFORMS 
Label Causal Condition Consistency 
IMF IMF Pressure  0.77 
 ELEC Frequent Election 0.63 
AUTH Authoritarian Regime 0.23 
ALL Control of All Legislative Houses 0.49 
RW Right Wing Executive 0.46 
INF High Inflation 0.34 
DEBT High Debt 0.34 
CRISIS Economic Crisis (combined) 0.53 
RECESS Recession 0.15 
Note: Labels used in Tables 4.5-4.7 are listed on the right with the causal condition they 
represent listed in the column to the left.  
 
 As can be seen in Table 5.1 above, causal conditions for membership in the set of IMF 
pressure and ideological motivation – a combination of membership in the set of right-wing 
executive and high exports – were the only conditions above .7 in consistency. Membership in 
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the set of frequent elections had a consistency of .63, but no other causal conditions came close 
to the .8 threshold for consistency. Furthermore, the causal condition for recession showed very 
poor consistency. Further examination of this causal condition in both the regression analysis and 
truth tables led me to drop this causal condition from future fuzzy set analysis.  
 
Pathways to Neoliberal Market Reforms 
 The initial truth table analysis conducted used separate causal conditions for high debt 
and high inflation as well as right wing executive and high exports. The frequency cutoff for this 
table was 2 and the consistency cutoff was .95. Logical “and” is indicated by a ‘*’ while a logical 
“or” is indicated by a ‘+’. Logical “and” means that the conditions both must be included in the 
explanatory pathway while a logical “or” means that either term may be used. Conditions that are 
capitalized are present in the pathway whereas conditions that are lowercase are absent.  
After examining the results of this analysis presented in Table 5.2, I determined that the 
the opportunity conditions around economic crises, high debt and high inflation, are not present 
at the same time in any of the explanatory pathways. Furthermore, the coverage for each 
pathway was quite low. As a result, I decided to combine debt and inflation into a new causal 
condition called economic crisis. The “fuzzy or” logic used to create these new causal conditions 
means that the highest calibrated value from high debt and high inflation is used to create the 
causal condition for economic crisis. The truth table analyses conducted and presented in Table 
5.3 and 5.4 use these combined causal conditions. 
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TABLE 5.2: EXPLANATORY PATHWAYS TO NEOLIBERAL REFORMS COMPLEX SOLUTION 
WITH SEPARATE CAUSAL CONDITIONS FOR CRISES 
Explanatory pathway Consistency Coverage Unique Coverage 
RW*all*inf*debt *auth*ELEC + 0.99 0.06 0.05 
rw*all*INF*debt *IMF*auth*ELEC + 0.97 0.08 0.07 
RW*all*INF*debt*IMF*auth*elec + 0.98 0.07 0.05 
rw*ALL*inf*debt*IMF*auth*ELEC + 0.95 0.10 0.08 
Solution   0.97 0.28  
Note: Frequency cutoff is 2 and consistency cutoff was .95. Upper case denotes presence of causal condition while 
lower case denotes absence of causal condition. Analysis shown with high inflation, high debt, right wing executive, 
and high exports as separate causal conditions. A * indicates a logical and while a + indicates a logical or. Solution 
consistency and coverage reflects all of the explanatory pathways combined. 
  
 Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the truth table results for the complex and intermediate solutions 
respectively. Both results use frequency and consistency cutoffs of 3 and .9 respectively. The 
complex solution presented in Table 5.3 shows five different explanatory pathways for the 
occurrence of neoliberal market reforms. These five pathways all of consistency scores of .93 or 
higher and coverage scores from 0.07 to 0.34. The overall solution consistency and coverage 
were .92 and .51 respectively. While the coverage scores are not exceptional, in that no one 
solution covers a majority of cases, fsQCA prioritizes causal complexity and therefore values 
consistency scores over coverage. Of the five different pathways, ideological motivation and 
IMF pressure are present in four out the five. The other causal conditions including economic 
crisis, frequent elections, and control of all houses of the legislature, were present in only two out 
of five, or one out of five for authoritarian government. The overlap of conditions suggests that 
there is some room for simplification in the explanatory pathways.  
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To simplify the more complex solution, the fs/QCA software uses Boolean logic to 
absorb more complex terms into simpler terms if the former is a subset of the latter (Ragin 2000; 
Ragin and Davey 2016). The results for these simplifications are shown in table 5.4 below which 
shows the intermediate solution.  
 
TABLE 5.4: EXPLANATORY PATHWAYS TO NEOLIBERAL REFORMS INTERMEDIATE 
SOLUTION 
Explanatory pathway Consistency Coverage Unique Coverage 
RW*auth*ELEC*crisis + 0.93 0.19 0.09 
IMF*auth*elec*crisis + 0.92 0.25 0.05 
ALL*IMF*auth*ELEC + 0.94 0.22 0.04 
RW*ALL*IMF*CRISIS + 0.96 0.15 0.05 
rw*all*IMF*auth*crisis 0.89 0.13 0.05 
Solution 0.90 0.55  
Note: Frequency cutoff is 3 and consistency cutoff was .9. Upper case denotes presence while lower case 
denotes absences. Analysis shown with combined causal conditions for economic crisis. A * indicates a 
logical and while a + indicates a logical or. Solution consistency and coverage reflects all of the explanatory 
pathways combined. 
 
 The intermediate solution shown in Table 5.4 includes four distinct explanatory pathways 
with consistencies between 0.89 and 0.96 and coverage scores between 0.13 and 0.25. The 
overall solution consistency and coverage scores were .90 and .55 respectively. Simplifying the 
explanatory pathways caused a small drop in consistency scores but significantly increased 
TABLE 5.3:  EXPLANATORY PATHWAYS TO NEOLIBERAL REFORMS COMPLEX 
SOLUTION 
Explanatory pathway Consistency Coverage Unique Coverage 
ALL*IMF*auth*ELEC + 0.94 0.22 0.12 
rw*all*IMF*auth*crisis + 0.89 0.13 0.05 
RW*all*auth*ELEC*crisis + 0.94 0.15 0.08 
all*IMF*auth*elec*CRISIS + 0.95 0.18 0.06 
RW*ALL*IMF*AUTH*elec*CRISIS 0.98 0.04 0.03 
Solution 0.91 0.51  
Note: Frequency cutoff is 3 and consistency cutoff was .9. Upper case denotes presence while lower case 
denotes absences. Analysis shown with combined causal conditions for economic crisis.  A * indicates a 
logical and while a + indicates a logical or.  Solution consistency and coverage reflects all of the 
explanatory pathways combined. 
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coverage scores. The IMF pressure causal condition was present in four out of the five 
explanatory pathways. The right-wing executive, control of all legislative houses, and frequent 
elections causal conditions were each present in two out of the five pathways. While the causal 
condition for crisis was present in only one pathway and the causal condition for not-
authoritarian regime was present in four out of the five pathways. While further simplification 
from this point is possible, the resulting loss in consistency was too great (dropping below .75) 
with only marginal increases in coverage. In addition, further simplification risks losing some of 
the causal complexity, making the model overly simplistic. Each pathway in Table 5.4 along 
with the countries involved are listed below. An (RW) after the country name indicates that this 
country had a RW executive during this time period. This is an important distinction since cases 
are comprised of the years when the executive branch was right-wing and not right-wing. 
Therefore, some countries have multiple entries, one with a right-wing government and another 
with a left-wing government.  Furthermore, some countries are covered by multiple pathways 
and are therefore listed under each applicable pathway. Countries are listed in the order of their 
degree of membership in that particular pathway. 
 
Pathway 1. The first pathway includes right-wing executive, frequent elections, the 
absence of an authoritarian government, and the absence of a crisis. The countries covered in this 
pathway are listed here from highest membership in the pathway to lowest: Lithuania (RW), El 
Salvador (RW), Latvia (RW), India (RW), Thailand (RW), Estonia (RW), Guatemala (RW), 
Peru (RW), Colombia (RW), and the Czech Republic (RW). This pathway includes elements of 
ideological motivation and opportunity to reform.  
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Pathway 2. The second pathway involves IMF pressure, absence of authoritarian regime, 
absence of frequent elections, and economic crisis. The countries included in this pathway are 
Ghana (RW), Nicaragua (RW), Indonesia, Romania (RW), Bolivia (RW), Latvia, Senegal, and 
Uruguay.  This pathway includes causal factors from only the opportunity or pressure factors. 
 
Pathway 3. The third pathway is comprised of control of all legislative houses, IMF 
pressure, frequent elections, and absence of an authoritarian regime. The countries included in 
this pathway are Georgia, Argentina (RW), Estonia (RW), Mexico, Peru (RW), Albania, 
Guatemala (RW), Bulgaria (RW), the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Venezuela (RW), and Poland. This 
pathway includes opportunity, and capability factors.  
 
Pathway 4. The fourth pathway consists of right-wing executive, control of all legislative 
houses, IMF pressure, and economic crisis. The countries included in this pathway are Bulgaria 
(RW), Ghana (RW), Russia (RW), Indonesia (RW), Nigeria (RW), Argentina (RW), Uganda 
(RW), and Venezuela (RW). This pathway involves causal conditions for ideological motivation, 
opportunity, and capability.  
 
Pathway 5. The fifth and final pathway consists of absence of right-wing executive, 
absence of the control of all legislative houses, IMF pressure, absence of authoritarian regime, 
and absence of economic crisis. Countries included in this pathway are India, Brazil, Peru, 
Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. This pathway only includes opportunity or pressure 
factors.  
  
102 
 
 Overall, the results of the fsQCA suggest some support for Hypotheses A and B. In 
Pathway 1 and 4, ideological motivation, in the form of a right-wing executive, was present 
along with either opportunity and/or capability conditions, supporting Hypothesis A – that 
ideological motivation combined with opportunity and/or capability would be sufficient to 
induce reform. Support for Hypothesis B – that a combination of opportunity and capability 
would be sufficient to implement reform – was in Pathway 3, suggesting that opportunity 
conditions, particularly IMF pressure occurring along with capability conditions, such as control 
of all legislative houses, can lead to reform. Interestingly two pathways, only had opportunity 
factors in the form of IMF pressure in Pathway 5, and in the form of IMF pressure and economic 
crisis in Pathway 3. This result along with the fact that IMF pressure is present in 4 out of the 5 
pathways suggests that the IMF plays a large role in the implementation of neoliberal market 
reforms.  
 
PATHWAYS TO NEOLIBERAL MARKET REFORMS 
 Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis is used to explore the different explanatory 
pathways countries take to adopt neoliberal market reforms. The fsQCA results are primarily 
used to examine the second of my two questions that began this project: What are the different 
pathways to neoliberal market reform? Based on the literature on the implementation of 
neoliberal market reforms I developed a theoretical framework involving ideological motivation, 
capability to enact reform, and opportunity to implement reforms and two hypotheses based on 
this framework. The fsQCA analysis discussed here is used to test these hypotheses and address 
the efficacy of my theoretical framework. Hypotheses A and B are restated below: 
103 
 
• Hypothesis A states that ideological motivation for reform combined with the 
opportunity and/or capability to adopt reforms is sufficient to implement 
neoliberal market reforms. 
• Hypothesis B claims that the capability to implement reforms combined with an 
opportunity to enact reforms will be sufficient to implement neoliberal market 
reforms.  
The remainder of the fsQCA section is organized in the following manner. First, the 
analysis of necessary conditions is discussed. Next, I provide a brief overview of the analysis of 
sufficient conditions. Third, I discuss each of the explanatory pathways in the intermediate 
solution presented in Table 5.4. Finally, I conclude with a review of the results for fsQCA and 
some concluding remarks. 
 
Conditions Necessary for Neoliberal Market Reforms 
 The analysis of necessary conditions did not show many conditions that meet the 
threshold for a necessary condition. IMF conditionality came closest with a consistency of 0.77 
and coverage of 0.75. However, the analysis of necessary conditions did reveal some conditions 
that scored very low on the consistency. Consistency and coverage scores for membership in 
authoritarian regime and recession were both very low. Furthermore, recession was always 
negative in the logistic regression analysis and only significant in the privatization models. In the 
truth table analyses for sufficient conditions, recession did not show up as causal condition in the 
vast majority of the pathways and did not show up in the simplified models. The decision was 
therefore made to drop recession as a condition. Authoritarian government was kept because 
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although the consistency score was low, the coverage score was slightly higher, and the absence 
of authoritarian government was in several the explanatory pathways.  
 While the necessary conditions are not particularly revealing on their own, in 
combination with the logistic regression results we can start to see some patterns. IMF 
conditionality or pressure is strong in both the logistic regression results as well as in the 
necessary condition results. Interestingly, the combined measure for ideology – a fuzzy or 
combination of right-wing executive and high exports – had the second highest consistency 
score. This may mean that ideology plays some role in the implementation of neoliberal market 
reforms that is not captured by the regression analysis. Perhaps ideology is only important when 
certain other causal conditions are present. This will be examined more in the analysis of 
sufficient conditions. The analysis of necessary conditions provides a useful glimpse into the 
relative importance of various causal conditions but does not provide much insight into the 
explanatory pathways that lead to reform. 
 
Sufficient Conditions for Neoliberal Market Reforms 
 Sufficient conditions are conditions that when present (or absent) together lead to the 
outcome of interest. I refer to these combinations of sufficient conditions as explanatory 
pathways for the sake of simplicity. The discussion of sufficient conditions is broken down by 
pathway. Each pathway is presented, along with the cases represented by that pathway, and then 
discussed in terms of the theoretical and empirical implications. It is important to remember that 
the cases represented by the explanatory pathways are not mutually exclusive. Some cases might 
belong to one or more explanatory pathway. In addition, these pathways presented represent a 
certain degree of simplification from the complex solution. This means that some causal 
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complexity, and therefore consistency, is lost in return for increased coverage and 
generalizability.  
The discussion of each pathway begins with the theoretical implications of the pathway 
and then provides an illustrative example of that pathway. Each example is chosen based on that 
country’s membership in the pathway, then on membership in the set of neoliberal reforms, and 
finally on the amount of information available. The membership scores for the exemplar country 
are listed in parentheses with the pathway membership first followed by membership in the set of 
neoliberal reforms.  
 
Pathway 1. The first pathway includes right-wing executive, frequent elections, the 
absence of an authoritarian government, and the absence of a crisis. This pathway includes an 
ideological motivation for reform as well as an opportunity to implement that reform in the form 
of frequent elections. This pathway supports Hypothesis A that a combination of ideological 
motivation with either opportunity or capability is sufficient to lead to reform. A total of 10 
countries were included in this pathway all of which had a right-wing executive. This suggests, 
as hypothesized, that in countries where there is an ideological motivation or predilection for 
reform an election can provide an opportunity to implement reforms. This ‘honeymoon 
hypothesis’ put forward by Williamson (1994) proposes that in democratic regimes major 
reforms are easiest to implement after an election. Weyland (2002), goes further, suggesting that 
newly elected politicians may feel that they have a mandate for reform and are therefore more 
likely to pursue riskier reforms.  
However, the fsQCA methods employed here do not directly test the timing of these 
elections, only that there were frequent elections. As such, there is no way to verify if the timing 
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of the election is the actual condition leaving open the possibility that election timing is not a 
major factor in reforms (Arpac et al. 2008). Nevertheless, frequent elections in a democratic 
regime along with the ideological motivation for reform seem sufficient to implement neoliberal 
market reforms.  
An example of this pathway is Lithuania (0.94, 0.99) from 1998 through 2003. During 
this time period Lithuania was governed by a right of center president in Valdas Adamkus (1998-
2003). As a young man Adamkus and his family fled Lithuania to escape the Soviet Union 
eventually ending up in Chicago. In the United States, Adamkus joined the Air Force and 
eventually worked in Ronald Reagan administration before returning to Lithuania to run for 
president. As only the second president after the fall of the Soviet Union, President Adamkus 
pursued reforms to liberalize the economy including financial reforms and privatizations as well 
as institutionalizing reforms undertaken by the previous government (Atas 2018). President 
Adamkus’ exposure to neoliberal policies came from his education in the United States as well 
as his work in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. In addition, most of the reforms 
during President Adamkus’ first term were implemented in the first two years, shortly after his 
election. Finally, President Adamkus was democratically elected with a polity score of 10, as 
democratic as possible. Furthermore, he entered office when the country was somewhat 
stabilized after a period of recession and high inflation. President Adamkus did agree to enter 
IMF conditionality, but only after a number of reforms had already been implemented.  
The example of Lithuania demonstrates how an ideologically motivated executive, in this 
case due to anti-communist sentiment and exposure to neoliberal ideals in the United States, 
combined with an opportunity to implement reforms, for example during a honeymoon period 
after an election, can be sufficient to implement neoliberal market reforms.  
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Pathway 2. The second pathway involves IMF pressure, absence of authoritarian regime, 
absence of frequent elections, and economic crisis. This pathway only includes factors for the 
opportunity or pressure to implement neoliberal market reforms. Subsequently, this pathway 
goes against both Hypothesis A and B. This pathway includes eight countries of which four had 
right-wing executives.  
This pathway shows the conditions most commonly referenced when discussing the IMF 
and neoliberalism; economic crisis and IMF pressure. Global political economy arguments 
emphasize the role of economic crises, particularly debt, in pushing countries towards IMF 
lending (Klein 2008; Drazen and Easterly; 2001). Finally, the results from this pathway support 
research by Kaufman and Stallings (1989) as well as Campos, Hsiao, and Nugent (2010) that 
contend democracies tend to implement more reforms than autocratic or authoritarian 
governments.  
Nicaragua (0.99, 0.62) from 1990-2006 is a good example of this pathway. Under the 
Presidencies of Violeta Chamorro (1990-1997), José Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo (1997-2002) and 
Enrique Bolaños Geyer (2002-2007) neoliberal market reforms were adopted in rapid succession. 
The push for reforms began in 1990 when a coalition of predominately right-wing and center-
right parties coalesced to oppose Daniel Ortega’s reelection. Daniel Ortega was running as a 
member of the, Sandinista National Liberation Front, a populist left-wing party and the 
opposition coalition, led by Violeta Chamorra, ran on a pro-capitalism platform and was 
financially supported by the United States under the Bush Administration. Violeta Chamorra 
won, but her coalition was fractured with many competing parties and interests.  Despite the 
disagreements, President Chamorra began implementing privatizations, financial deregulations, 
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and tariff reductions. This wave of neoliberal reform was driven by a debt crisis, IMF 
conditionality, and an ideological motivation for reform.  
Nicaragua during the 1990s was under enormous debt. In 1990, external debt was 1224.9 
% of GDP and while there was significant improvement in debt over the decade, external debt 
remained above 100 percent of GDP until 2005. The debt crisis prompted numerous negotiations 
and agreements with the IMF. From 1991 to 2005, the average number of IMF conditions was 
just under 31, and the number of conditions exceeded 70 in some years. The combination of an 
ideological predisposition towards reform created by opposition to the Sandinista government 
and support from the Bush administration combined with the debt crisis and numerous IMF 
conditions was sufficient for the democratic government of Nicaragua to implement reforms.  
The example of Nicaragua illustrates how a democratic government under pressure from 
the IMF and facing an economic crisis in combination with a government that is at least not 
opposed to neoliberal reforms will enact these reforms. The Nicaraguan example is complicated 
by the more direct intervention of the Bush administration which casts doubt on how democratic 
the 1990 election was. However, this example serves to illustrate how ideology, crises, and IMF 
pressure interact to create conditions where neoliberal market reforms are adopted. 
 
Pathway 3. The third pathway is comprised of control of all legislative houses, IMF 
pressure, frequent elections, and absence of an authoritarian regime. This pathway includes 
pressure or opportunity to implement reforms in the form of IMF pressure and frequent elections 
as well as a capability factor in the form of the control of all legislative houses. This pathway 
includes a total of 12 countries six of which had a right-wing executive. This pathway supports 
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Hypothesis B that a combination of opportunity and capability factors is sufficient to implement 
neoliberal market reforms.  
This pathway supports arguments by global political economy scholars that IMF 
conditionality is a prominent tool used to push countries into adopting neoliberal market reforms 
(Peet 2009; Chang 2005). The pressure from the IMF on countries can be quite considerable 
when these countries are unable to secure loans from other sources. If the only option is the IMF, 
then a country will likely accept any conditions placed on said loans (Felix 1990). Countries that 
have accepted conditional lending from the IMF must still find ways of passing legislation, this 
is easier if the party in the executive branch, which negotiated the IMF loan, also controls the 
legislature (Smith et al 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). 
An example of this pathway Argentina (0.78, 0.94) from 1990 – 1999. Prior to 1990 
Argentina was dealing with hyperinflation and sky-rocketing debt like much of Latin America. 
Argentina was put under IMF conditionality starting in 1983, however the military government 
and subsequent left-leaning president Raul Alfonsin, resisted pressure to implement neoliberal 
market reforms. President Alfonsin attempted numerous times to fix Argentina’s growing 
economic issues, but was unable to appease both creditors, such as the IMF, and the public, 
particularly unions. As a result, the economic situation continued to worsen throughout the 
1980s. After his election in 1989, Menem, who had run as a populist reformer, immediately 
negotiated a new deal with the IMF and began pushing for neoliberal market reforms. President 
Menem’s party, the Partido Justicialista, controlled the legislature and allowed Menem to 
implement many reforms by decree, bypassing the lengthy legislative process. The result was 
that many reforms that had been postponed or resisted by President Alfonsin, were swiftly 
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implemented by President Menem, often over the complaints of opposition parties in the 
legislative branch as well as labor unions and general public.  
As noted in the Argentina example, the tipping point for reform was an executive that 
was not ideologically opposed to reforms and was able to take advantage of election timing and 
IMF pressure to implement reforms over public opposition. Argentina at this time was a 
considered a democracy despite President Menem’s ability to reform via decree. It was the 
combination of opportunity and capability that enabled Menem to push through reforms that 
were successfully resisted in the prior administrations. This is not to say that every case listed 
under this pathway will look the same as Argentina, there are plenty of local and regional 
variations not accounted for in the fsQCA models. However, the Argentina example can help 
illustrate how such a pathway could occur. Overall, the results from pathway 1 provide evidence 
to support my theoretical framework and Hypothesis B.  
 
Pathway 4. The fourth pathway consists of right-wing executive, control of all legislative 
houses, IMF pressure, and economic crisis. This pathway is the only pathway that includes 
causal conditions for all three of ideological motivation, capability, and opportunity. A total of 
eight countries are included in this pathway with all countries represented by a right-wing 
executive. The combination of an ideological motivation, the capability of implementing reforms 
by controlling all houses of the legislature, and the opportunity or pressure from economic crises 
and IMF pressure was the concept that most motivated the theoretical framework developed in 
this dissertation and includes causal conditions from all three broad theoretical approaches. It is a 
combination of the economic crisis literature, global political economy literature, and the 
political and institutional literature described in Chapter 2. 
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The example used for this pathway is Bulgaria (0.99, 0.97) from 1991-2001 in the decade 
following the fall of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Soviet bloc countries. Ideologically, 
the first two presidents after the fall of the Soviet Union, Zhelyu Mitev Zhelev (1992-1997) and 
Petar Stefanov Stojanov (1997 – 2002), were pro-democracy and anti-communism. Both 
presidents belonged to the Union of Democratic Forces, a center-right to right-wing political 
party in Bulgaria. In addition, both candidates ran on a platform of anti-communism and pro-
market reforms. In this context, the ideological motivation for reform came from political leaders 
that were pro-neoliberalism largely due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
opening of the political opportunities for formerly communist countries.  
In combination with this ideological motivation, Bulgaria from 1991-2001 experienced 
high external debt, averaging around 100 percent of GNI during this period, as well as high 
inflation, as much as 1058 percent in 1997. In addition to these economic crises, Bulgaria was 
under pressure from the IMF to reform, particularly financial deregulation and privatization of 
SOEs. From 1991-2001 Bulgaria averaged just under 50 conditions a year. These conditions 
combined to create immense pressure or opportunity for President Zhelev and President Stojanov 
to implement neoliberal market reforms. These reform efforts were further aided by the fact that 
the Union of Democratic Forces had near complete control of the legislature during this time, 
easing the passage of reforms. 
The Bulgaria example illustrates an almost perfect storm for neoliberal market reforms. 
Ideological motivation from the fall of the Soviet Union combined with IMF pressure and 
economic crises along with control of the legislative branches provided the conditions for the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms. While the Bulgaria example may not be 
representative of how other countries included in this pathway experience reforms, due to the 
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radical transition from Soviet style communism to free-market capitalism, it does provide 
valuable insight into how a combination of ideology, capability, and opportunity conditions can 
play out.  
 
Pathway 5. The fifth and final pathway consists of absence of right-wing executive, 
absence of the control of all legislative houses, IMF pressure, absence of authoritarian regime, 
and absence of economic crisis. This pathway contains only elements of opportunity or pressure 
in the form of IMF conditionality. In this pathway, there is an absence of both ideological 
motivation, capability, and economic crises. There is a total of five countries present in this 
pathway, none of which had a right-wing executive during the implementation of neoliberal 
market reforms. This pathway, like Pathway 2, does not support the theoretical framework laid 
out in this dissertation but does support the contentions of world systems and global political 
economy scholars that the IMF can be the main driver of reform (Peet 2009; Chang 2005; 
Vreeland 2007). This pathway suggests that when pressure from the IMF is great enough, it can 
overcome a reluctance to reform on the part of the executive as well as potential resistance from 
the legislature. Part of why this pathway might occur is a history of crisis or instability that is not 
accounted for the in the fsQCA models. If a country experienced an economic crisis in the recent 
past but is currently stable, politicians may still bear the scars of past experiences and may 
therefore be more willing to implement reforms, even during periods of relative stability. 
An example of this pathway is Brazil (0.87, 0.97) from 1995-2002 under President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Cardoso, a sociologist, was one of the major intellectuals in the 
dependency movement in Latin America that sought to move away from reliance on core 
countries (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). During his election, Cardoso was supported by broad 
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coalition of parties from the center and center-right (not enough to classify him as a true right-
wing executive). However, this coalition proved rather weak and difficult to maintain. 
Nevertheless, once in office, Cardoso moved to liberalize the economy, much like his 
predecessors.  
A big part of the reason Cardoso continued to pursue neoliberal reforms and was able to 
convince his coalition to do so, was the need to negotiate with the IMF for additional funds and 
continued support. Brazil had only recently returned to democratic governance in 1985 after two 
decades of military rule (Napolitano 2018). Moreover, Brazil had only recently come out of a 
recession that began in 1990 and had only recently stabilized inflation which had gone from 100 
percent inflation in 1981 to over 2,000 percent inflation in 1993 and finally down to 15 percent 
inflation in 1995. Cardoso had served as finance minister under the previous administration and 
was therefore very aware of the threat of inflation and debt. Subsequently, the threat of economic 
crisis was still relatively fresh in the minds of politicians and the public. Much of President 
Cardoso’s subsequent policies including privatizations, credit restrictions, and the Plano Real 
were meant to stabilize the country further and get IMF approval (Amann and Bae 2002). 
Finally, in 1999, after several years of negotiations President Cardoso agreed to IMF 
conditionality with a total of 148 IMF conditions paving the way for future lending and IMF 
conditions. 
The Brazil example demonstrates how a country with a relatively centrist government 
and a relatively stable economy can still feel pressured to implement reforms in order to receive 
IMF conditional lending. Even the specter of past economic crises can be motivating for political 
leaders. While Brazil is by no means representative of all countries in this pathway, the Brazilian 
example reveals some of the drawbacks of the methodological approach and data in this study. 
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By not taking into consideration past experiences, neither the regression analysis nor fsQCA can 
be completely accurate in their modeling of neoliberal market reforms. Future research should 
attempt to take into account how past experiences shape policy reform.  
 
Concluding thoughts for fsQCA 
Overall, the pathways discussed above provide moderate support for the theoretical 
framework developed in this dissertation. Indeed, Pathways 1 and 4 all support Hypothesis A 
that ideological motivation for reform combined with the opportunity and/or capability to adopt 
reforms is sufficient to implement neoliberal market reforms while Pathways 3 and 4 support 
Hypothesis B that the capability to implement reforms combined with an opportunity to enact 
reforms will be sufficient to implement neoliberal market reforms. Ideological motivation for 
reform appears in Pathways 1 and 4 while IMF pressure appears in Pathways 2, 3, 4, and 5. IMF 
conditionality or pressure appears to be important in explaining countries pathways to the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms. Even in the complex solution presented in Table 
5.3. IMF pressure was present in a majority of pathways to reform.   
Looking at the pathways from Table 5.4, there are two major patterns present. First 
ideological motivation combined with the opportunity to implement reform seems sufficient to 
implement neoliberal market reforms in some countries. Second, a combination of opportunity 
(more accurately pressure) and capability seems sufficient to adopt neoliberal market reforms in 
some countries. Third, in a number of countries opportunity or pressure factors in the form of 
IMF pressure and economic crises appear to be sufficient for these countries to adopt reforms. 
These patterns, however, might be because IMF conditionality is close to a necessary condition 
and is also considered an opportunity condition. Taken together, the fsQCA pathways support 
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the global political economy literature that the IMF is a major driver of reform while providing 
moderate support for my theory that some combination of ideological motivation for reform, 
opportunity to pass reform legislation, and the capability to enact reforms would be present for 
the implementation of neoliberal market reforms.  
It is interesting how common ideological motivation is as a causal condition compared to 
the lack of significance for ideological variables in the regression results. This contradiction may 
indicate that ideological motivation only matters when it is combined with certain other causal 
conditions but is not itself cause of reform. Rather ideological motivation may act as an 
underlying condition that when combined with other conditions, helps contribute to reform.  
IMF pressure on the other hand, seems closer to a true necessary condition. Not only did 
IMF pressure score high on the analysis of necessary conditions, it also was significant in most 
of the regression models and was present in a large majority of the fsQCA explanatory pathway 
models. The results from the fsQCA models suggest that critics of IMF conditionality and global 
political economists are right in placing at least some of the responsibility for neoliberal market 
reforms at the feet of the IMF. Based on the fsQCA results and logistic regression results, there 
is little evidence to suggest that IMF conditionality is mediated by local political or institutional 
factors beyond economic crises, which may be a precursor to IMF conditionality.  
Frequent elections and crises each appear in two of the five pathways, but not together in 
the same pathway. Both seem to act as an opportunity for leaders to implement reform if other 
conditions are present. In contrast to the theories developed in this project, authoritarian regimes 
were not part of any of the pathways to reform in any of the fsQCA models. This may be because 
authoritarian regimes are either better able to resist external pressures or that authoritarian 
regimes were already on the decline when neoliberal market reforms became more prominent. 
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Either way, the role of democracy and authoritarianism in neoliberal reforms warrants further 
investigation in the future.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEOLIBERAL MARKET 
REFORMS 
The implementation of market reforms is complex and varied. This project attempted to 
capture this complexity and variation in reforms by using multiple methods to examine the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms. This chapter provides a cohesive discussion of 
both the logistic regression and fsQCA results in relation to the literature on neoliberal market 
reforms and my own theoretical conceptualization of reform. Overall, the results of both the 
regression and fsQCA provide support the claims by global political economy scholars, 
dependency theorists, and world system scholars that the IMF played a major role in the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms. There was also evidence to support the idea that 
economic crises, particularly inflation and debt, were potential causal factors in the adoption of 
reforms. The results provided mixed evidence for the theoretical framework developed in this 
project. Ideological motivation does not seem to play a significant role in the implementation of 
reforms, at least in the regression results, while the fsQCA shows ideological motivation in three 
of the four main explanatory pathways. Opportunity and capability factors do seem to play some 
role in implementation, with variables for both being significant in some of the regression 
models, particularly for privatization, while opportunity causal conditions are included in every 
explanatory pathway in the fsQCA results. 
 This project has taken both a variable oriented approach –regression – and a case-
oriented approach – fsQCA. Each approach was used to address related but different questions 
surrounding the implementation of neoliberal market reforms and the role of IMF conditionality 
in these reforms. The combination of these approaches provides a more complete picture of the 
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implementation of neoliberal reform than either could provide on their own. The logistic 
regression analysis allows for an examination of which independent variables are correlated and 
potentially causally linked to an increased likelihood of neoliberal reforms. The knowledge 
gained from the regression results in turn is used to calibrate and specify the fsQCA models. The 
fsQCA models allow for a more case-based exploration of the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms by looking different explanatory pathways to reform. The overall result of using both 
methods is a more complete understanding of how and why neoliberal market reforms are 
implemented and the role of the IMF in the adoption of these reforms.  
 The results from the logistic regression and fsQCA show mixed support for the 
theoretical framework laid out in this dissertation. I theorized that a combination of ideological 
motivation, represented by exports and right-wing executives, the capability to enact reforms, 
denoted by control of all legislative houses or authoritarian government, and the opportunity to 
adopt reforms, operationalized by IMF conditionality, economic crises, and elections, would 
result in the implementation of neoliberal market reforms. Both the regression results and the 
fsQCA results showed some support for my theoretical framework.  
The variables for ideological motivation were not significant in any of the regression 
models, except for tariff reform. However, ideological motivation, as a causal condition, was 
present in two out of the five explanatory pathways in the fsQCA analysis of sufficient 
conditions. This suggests that ideological motivation is very dependent on the context in which 
reforms, or lack of reforms takes place. However, right-wing executives as a measure of 
ideological motivation may not be totally reliable or valid. Other interests may play role such as 
business interests or foreign pressure, such as the United States in many Central and South 
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American countries. Future research should consider a different measures that captures business 
and foreign interests.  
Capability factors were only significant in some of the regression models and control of 
legislative houses was only present in two of the explanatory pathways discussed. The results 
here seem to support the contention of Kaufman and Stallings (1989) and Campos, Hsiao, and 
Nugent (2010) that democracies are more likely to enact neoliberal market reforms. Control of 
the legislative branch was significant in the regression models for privatization and was present 
in two of the explanatory pathways suggesting that legislative control can ease the passage of 
reforms.  
The results for opportunity factors varied widely. There was very strong evidence for the 
role of IMF conditionality in the passage of neoliberal reforms and fairly strong evidence that 
economic crises, especially debt, were factors in the implementation of neoliberal market 
reforms. These results closely align with the findings of global political economy models, 
particularly world systems and dependency theories, as well as critics of IMF conditionality who 
blame the IMF for the implementation of neoliberal market reforms and the resulting inequality 
(Peet 2009; Barra and Dello Buono 2009; Chang 2009). Finally, there was almost no support for 
the role of elections in the implementation of neoliberal market reforms. Elections were not 
significant in any of the regression models. However, frequent elections did show up in two of 
the five pathways, although there was little control for the timing of these elections in the fsQCA 
analysis.  
Overall the results from the logistic regression and fsQCA are not enough to confirm the 
theoretical framework developed in this dissertation. Results from both methods show IMF 
conditionality or pressure as the dominate factor in the implementation of neoliberal reforms. 
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There is little evidence that IMF conditionality was mediated by local political or institutional 
factors to any great degree with a couple of exceptions.  However, there was some support to 
suggest that IMF pressure is mediated by how democratic a country is and the extent of the crises 
faced by a country. The results do seem to confirm the theories put forward by world-systems 
scholars, dependency theorists, and critics of global neoliberalism and the IMF. More work is 
needed to fully separate the role of the IMF from local political and economic factors.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH ON NEOLIBERAL MARKET REFORMS 
This project faced major limitations, particularly in terms of data availability and quality. 
Both regression and fsQCA can be detrimentally impacted by missing data especially if this 
missing data is non-random. Given that most of the countries in this study are countries 
experiencing transition periods or economic crises, there is undoubtably a lot of non-random 
missing data. Reporting data accurately to the large IFIs is not going to be a priority for countries 
undergoing a transition from communism or countries dealing with debt or inflation crises. 
Furthermore, many countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Honduras, experienced war or 
political crises that made accurate reporting of economic data difficult, if not impossible.   
While logistic regression in many cases can handle non-linear relationships and error 
terms that are not random, missing data for fsQCA can be more of an issue. Seawright (2005) 
notes that QCA is particularly susceptible to missing data and missing causal conditions. The 
amount of missing data in this study, makes the causal inference from both fsQCA potentially 
suspect. However, fsQCA in this project was not used exclusively to make causal inference, but 
rather as a way of parsing the different pathways countries took to reform. Most causal inference 
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was garnered from the logistic regression. Future research should include more complete data, 
especially for countries that were under the most extreme economic and political crises. 
Another limitation of this study is the fact that only three aspects of neoliberal reform are 
used. It seems likely, based on the results of the regression analysis, that neoliberal reforms can 
and should be analyzed as separate conditions in a regression analysis and that including more 
aspects of neoliberal reforms would help clarify how linked these reforms really are. Again, the 
decision to use only three types of reform was due to data limitations and future research should 
pursue data on other aspects of neoliberal market reforms including labor policy, tax policy, 
foreign investment, and social policies such as health care, education, social security, and public 
spending.  
Future research could also attempt to regionalize the analysis in order to see if the 
implementation of reforms varies by region. This project did initially attempt to regionalize the 
data, but no real patterns were found largely because of the amount of missing data and the 
subsequent drop in the number of cases. Regionalizing also faces the issue of what regional 
definitions to use and the extent to which the research can rely on the World Banks or IMF’s 
definition of a region. 
Finally, it is likely that in order to fully understand how local political and institutional 
factors mediate reforms a separate analysis needs to be done specifically focusing on countries 
that did not implement neoliberal reforms but faced some of the same pressures from the 
international community, particularly the IMF. Unfortunately, countries that were under IMF 
conditionality and did not implement neoliberal reforms are very rare. In fact, it is very rare to 
find any countries that did not some aspect of neoliberal reforms outside of the communist 
countries. Any analysis of how countries resist neoliberal reforms would therefore likely be done 
122 
 
through case studies or fsQCA. Additionally, the factors that influence the implementation of 
neoliberal market reforms are unlikely to be the same as the factors that help a country resist 
neoliberalism. A different theoretical and empirical approach would need to be taken from the 
one presented in this project.  
In conclusion, this project has attempted to create a better understanding of the 
implementation of neoliberal market reforms in peripheral countries through the creation of a 
new theoretical framework and by using different methodological approaches. The results 
highlighted the role of the IMF and external/global factors in the implementation of neoliberal 
market reforms, supporting the global political economy literature. Furthermore, global and 
external forces seem to have more of role in shaping reforms and pushing reforms than local 
political and institutional factors. Finally, there was mixed support for the theoretical framework 
developed in this project but supported those that maintain that the IMF was the major driver of 
neoliberal market reforms.  
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Appendix B: Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables 
 
Privatization Tariffs Financial Deregulation 
Privatization 1.0000 
  
Tariffs 0.0255 1.000 
 
Financial Deregulation 0.0381 -0.074 1.0000 
